# Doubles---Texas 21

## 1NC

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#### The resolution should define the division of ground. It was negotiated and announced in advance providing both teams a reasonable opportunity to prepare. Only a textual reading of the resolution provides a predictable basis for research.

#### USFG means the three branches.

OECD 87. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Control and Management of Government Expenditure. 179. Google Book.

1. Political and organizational structure of government The United States America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information). The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### ‘Resolved’ means to enact a policy by law.

Words and Phrases 64. Permanent Edition. Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### ‘Antitrust laws’ are statutes.

Grimes ’20 [Charles W; 2020; editor of this Licensing Update and Law Professor at Ava Maria Law School; Wolters Kluwer, “Licensing Update,” https://www.crowell.com/files/20200401-Licensing-Update-Chapter-13.pdf]

§13.02 ANTITRUST LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### Their ‘scope’ is defined by government.

Sagers ’15 [Christopher L; 2015; the James A. Thomas Distinguished Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Cleveland-Marshall Solo Practice Incubator; Handbook on the Scope of Antitrust, “Introduction,” Ch. 1, p. 9]

B. Sources of the Scope of Antitrust Law

The scope of federal antitrust law is governed by three separate authorities: (1) the U.S. Constitution, (2) the language of the antitrust statutes themselves, and (3) the language of other federal statutes and regulations.

#### Vote Neg:

#### 1. Clash: debate requires a predictable topic to motivate in depth research that yields the values of negation and argument refinement. Their interp explodes limits, allows affirmative conditionality, and makes debate a one-sided monologue devoid of argumentation which turns the case.

#### 2. Fairness: the neg should win on average 50% of the time. Entering a competitive activity proves their arguments are shaped by a drive to win. The insurmountable advantage of being affirmative under their unfair model is a reason they should lose.

### Off

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#### The aff causes transition wars---the move away from capitalism cause mass starvation, ecological collapse, and doesn’t solve their offense.

George MONBIOT 9. Visiting Professor in the School of the Built Environment, Oxford Brookes University; recipient of the United Nations Global 500 Award for outstanding environmental achievement; named one of the forty international prophets of the twenty-first century by the UK’S Independent. “Is There Any Point in Fighting to Stave Off Industrial Apocalypse.” Guardian. August 17. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/aug/17/environment-climate-change>.

The interesting question, and the one that probably divides us, is this: to what extent should we welcome the likely collapse of industrial civilisation? Or more precisely: to what extent do we believe that some good may come of it?

I detect in your writings, and in the conversations we have had, an attraction towards – almost a yearning for – this apocalypse, a sense that you see it as a cleansing fire that will rid the world of a diseased society. If this is your view, I do not share it. I'm sure we can agree that the immediate consequences of collapse would be hideous: the breakdown of the systems that keep most of us alive; mass starvation; war. These alone surely give us sufficient reason to fight on, however faint our chances appear. But even if we were somehow able to put this out of our minds, I believe that what is likely to come out on the other side will be worse than our current settlement.

Here are three observations: 1 Our species (unlike most of its members) is tough and resilient; 2 When civilisations collapse, psychopaths take over; 3 We seldom learn from others' mistakes.

From the first observation, this follows: even if you are hardened to the fate of humans, you can surely see that our species will not become extinct without causing the extinction of almost all others. However hard we fall, we will recover sufficiently to land another hammer blow on the biosphere. We will continue to do so until there is so little left that even Homo sapiens can no longer survive. This is the ecological destiny of a species possessed of outstanding intelligence, opposable thumbs and an ability to interpret and exploit almost every possible resource – in the absence of political restraint.

From the second and third observations, this follows: instead of gathering as free collectives of happy householders, survivors of this collapse will be subject to the will of people seeking to monopolise remaining resources. This will is likely to be imposed through violence. Political accountability will be a distant memory. The chances of conserving any resource in these circumstances are approximately zero. The human and ecological consequences of the first global collapse are likely to persist for many generations, perhaps for our species' remaining time on earth. To imagine that good could come of the involuntary failure of industrial civilisation is also to succumb to denial. The answer to your question – what will we learn from this collapse? – is nothing.

This is why, despite everything, I fight on. I am not fighting to sustain economic growth. I am fighting to prevent both initial collapse and the repeated catastrophe that follows. However faint the hopes of engineering a soft landing – an ordered and structured downsizing of the global economy – might be, we must keep this possibility alive. Perhaps we are both in denial: I, because I think the fight is still worth having; you, because you think it isn't.

#### Those transition wars go nuclear---negative trade expectations undermine deterrence.

Stein TØNNESSON 15. Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University. “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace.” *International Area Studies Review* 18(3): 297-311. Emory Libraries.

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among interdependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party.

Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

#### The transition fails---proves they can’t solve their impacts or ours.

Hubert Buch-Hansen 18. Associate Professor, Department of Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School. “The Prerequisites for a Degrowth Paradigm Shift: Insights from Critical Political Economy.” *Ecological Economics* 146: 157-63. Emory Libraries.

Still, the degrowth project is nowhere near enjoying the degree and type of support it needs if its policies are to be implemented through democratic processes. The number of political parties, labour unions, business associations and international organisations that have so far embraced degrowth is modest to say the least. Economic and political elites, including social democratic parties and most of the trade union movement, are united in the belief that economic growth is necessary and desirable. This consensus finds support in the prevailing type of economic theory and underpins the main contenders in the neoliberal project, such as centre-left and nationalist projects. In spite of the world's multidimensional crisis, a pro-growth discourse in other words continues to be hegemonic: it is widely considered a matter of common sense that continued economic growth is required.

It is also noteworthy that economic and political elites, to a large extent, continue to support the neoliberal project, even in the face of its evident shortcomings. Indeed, the 2008 financial crisis did not result in the weakening of transnational financial capital that could have paved the way for a paradigm shift. Instead of coming to an end, neoliberal capitalism has arguably entered a more authoritarian phase (Bruff, 2014). The main reason the power of the pre-crisis coalition remains intact is that governments stepped in and saved the dominant fraction by means of massive bailouts. It is a foregone conclusion that this fraction and the wider coalition behind the neoliberal paradigm (transnational industrial capital, the middle classes and segments of organized labour) will consider the degrowth paradigm unattractive and that such social forces will vehemently oppose the implementation of degrowth policies (see also Rees, 2014: 97).

While degrowth advocates envision a future in which market forces play a less prominent role than they do today, degrowth is not an antimarket project. As such, it can attract support from certain types of market actors. In particular, it is worth noting that social enterprises, such as cooperatives (Restakis, 2010), play a major role in the degrowth vision. Such enterprises are defined by being ‘organisations involved at least to some extent in the market, with a clear social, cultural and/or environmental purpose, rooted in and serving primarily the local community and ideally having a local and/or democratic ownership structure’ (Johanisova et al., 2013: 11). Social enterprises currently exist at the margins of a system, in which the dominant type of business entity is profit-oriented, shareholder-owned corporations. The further dissemination of social enterprises, which is crucial to the transitions to degrowth societies, is – in many cases – blocked or delayed as a result of the centrifugal forces of global competition (Wigger and Buch-Hansen, 2013). Overall, social enterprises thus (still) constitute a social force with modest power.

Ougaard (2016: 467) notes that one of the major dividing lines in the contemporary transnational capitalist class is between capitalists who have a material interest in the carbon-based economy and capitalists who have a material interest in decarbonisation. The latter group, for instance, includes manufacturers of equipment for the production of renewable energy (ibid.: 467). As mentioned above, degrowth advocates have singled out renewable energy as one of the sectors that needs to grow in the future. As such, it seems likely that the owners of national and transnational companies operating in this sector would be more positively inclined towards the degrowth project than would capitalists with a stake in the carbon-based economy. Still, the prospect of the “green sector” emerging as a driving force behind degrowth currently appears meagre. Being under the control of transnational capital (Harris, 2010), such companies generally embrace the “green growth” discourse, which ‘is deeply embedded in neoliberal capitalism’ and indeed serves to adjust this form of capitalism ‘to crises arising from contradictions within itself’ (Wanner, 2015: 23).

In addition to support from the social forces engendered by the production process, a political project ‘also needs the political ability to mobilize majorities in parliamentary democracies, and a sufficient measure of at least passive consent’ (van Apeldoorn and Overbeek, 2012: 5–6) if it is to become hegemonic. As mentioned, degrowth enjoys little support in parliaments, and certainly the pro-growth discourse is hegemonic among parties in government.5 With capital accumulation being the most important driving force in capitalist societies, political decision-makers are generally eager to create conditions conducive to production and the accumulation of capital (Lindblom, 1977: 172). Capitalist states and international organisations are thus “programmed” to facilitate capital accumulation, and do as such constitute a strategically selective terrain that works to the disadvantage of the degrowth project.

The main advocates of the degrowth project are grassroots, small fractions of left-wing parties and labour unions as well as academics and other citizens who are concerned about social injustice and the environmentally unsustainable nature of societies in the rich parts of the world. The project is thus ideationally driven in the sense that support for it is not so much rooted in the material circumstances or short-term self-interests of specific groups or classes as it is rooted in the conviction that degrowth is necessary if current and future generations across the globe are to be able to lead a good life. While there is no shortage of enthusiasts and creative ideas in the degrowth movement, it has only modest resources compared to other political projects. To put it bluntly, the advocates of degrowth do not possess instruments that enable them to force political decision-makers to listen to – let alone comply with – their views. As such, they are in a weaker position than the labour union movement was in its heyday, and they are in a far weaker position than the owners and managers of large corporations are today (on the structural power of transnational corporations, see Gill and Law, 1989).

6. Consent

It is also safe to say that degrowth enjoys no “passive consent” from the majority of the population. For the time being, degrowth remains unknown to most people. Yet, if it were to become generally known, most people would probably not find the vision of a smaller economic system appealing. This is not just a matter of degrowth being ‘a missile word that backfires’ because it triggers negative feelings in people when they first hear it (Drews and Antal, 2016). It is also a matter of the actual content of the degrowth project.

Two issues in particular should be mentioned in this context. First, for many, the anti-capitalist sentiments embodied in the degrowth project will inevitably be a difficult pill to swallow. Today, the vast majority of people find it almost impossible to conceive of a world without capitalism. There is a ‘widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but also that it is now impossible to even imagine a coherent alternative to it’ (Fisher, 2009: 2). As Jameson (2003) famously observed, it is, in a sense, easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism. However, not only is degrowth – like other anti-capitalist projects – up against the challenge that most people consider capitalism the only system that can function; it is also up against the additional challenge that it speaks against economic growth in a world where the desirability of growth is considered common sense.

Second, degrowth is incompatible with the lifestyles to which many of us who live in rich countries have become accustomed. Economic growth in the Western world is, to no small extent, premised on the existence of consumer societies and an associated consumer culture most of us find it difficult to completely escape. In this culture, social status, happiness, well-being and identity are linked to consumption (Jackson, 2009). Indeed, it is widely considered a natural right to lead an environmentally unsustainable lifestyle – a lifestyle that includes car ownership, air travel, spacious accommodations, fashionable clothing, an omnivorous diet and all sorts of electronic gadgets. This Western norm of consumption has increasingly been exported to other parts of the world, the result being that never before have so many people taken part in consumption patterns that used to be reserved for elites (Koch, 2012). If degrowth were to be institutionalised, many citizens in the rich countries would have to adapt to a materially lower standard of living. That is, while the basic needs of the global population can be met in a non-growing economy, not all wants and preferences can be fulfilled (Koch et al., 2017). Undoubtedly, many people in the rich countries would experience various limitations on their consumption opportunities as a violent encroachment on their personal freedom. Indeed, whereas many recognize that contemporary consumer societies are environmentally unsustainable, fewer are prepared to actually change their own lifestyles to reverse/address this.

At present, then, the degrowth project is in its “deconstructive phase”, i.e., the phase in which its advocates are able to present a powerful critique of the prevailing neoliberal project and point to alternative solutions to crisis. At this stage, not enough support has been mobilised behind the degrowth project for it to be elevated to the phases of “construction” and “consolidation”. It is conceivable that at some point, enough people will become sufficiently discontent with the existing economic system and push for something radically different. Reasons for doing so could be the failure of the system to satisfy human needs and/or its inability to resolve the multidimensional crisis confronting humanity. Yet, various material and ideational path-dependencies currently stand in the way of such a development, particularly in countries with large middle-classes. Even if it were to happen that the majority wanted a break with the current system, it is far from given that a system based on the ideas of degrowth is what they would demand.

#### Economic decline makes their impacts worse, growth is progressive.

Philippe Aghion, Reda Cherif, & Fuad Hasanov 21. French economist who is a Professor at College de France, at INSEAD, and at the London School of Economics. Senior Economist at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Senior Economist at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and an Adjunct Professor of Economics at Georgetown University. “Competition, Innovation, and Inclusive Growth.” <https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2021/080/article-A001-en.xml>.

There is a positive correlation between long-term growth and poverty alleviation. More specifically, Lant Pritchett argues, based on cross-country patterns, that “broad-based growth, defined as the process that raises median income, is far and away the most important source of poverty reduction.”9 The sharp decline in poverty rates in China (about 800 million people escaped poverty) amid the two decades of break-neck growth is the starkest illustration. As discussed, innovation-based growth based on Schumpeterian creative destruction is key to productivity gains and sustained growth. The question is how to achieve broad-based, high and sustained growth which means to spur the emergence of good paying jobs. This is perhaps one of the most difficult and debated questions in economics.

The standard view shared by most economists over the last few decades is that “horizontal policies”, that is improvements in education, the quality of institutions, infrastructure, business environment, and regulations are key. Many of these policies tackle what is known as “government failures” as described in Rodrik (2005). In other words, state intervention should limit itself to providing public goods and the provision of a good environment while crucially ensuring an adequate level of competition. In this context, firms would have the incentive to invest and deploy efforts to be competitive through improvements in productivity and innovation to offer new and better-quality goods among others.

However, growth can be harmed by anti-competitive behaviors or distortive policies which can take different and subtle forms and are not always easy to gauge. Among these, imposing barriers to entry or helping non-performing firms remain in business, could have a substantial negative effect. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) emphasize the importance of input reallocation effects. They show that aggregate productivity differentials can be explained by differences in terms of the distribution of firms’ productivity. This means that relatively less productive firms have access to a considerable share of the resources. They argue that it is harder for a more productive firm to grow but also easier for a less productive firm to survive in India than in the U.S. for example. In the same vein, Aghion (2016) suggests that that there is more business dynamism in the U.S. than India, that is more firms enter and exit, which would explain input misallocation and differences in income per capita.

Compared to the U.S., potential constraints in developing economies such as India include more rigid capital markets and labor/product markets, the lower supply of skills, the poorer quality of infrastructure, and the lower quality of institutions to protect property rights and to enforce contracts. However, even if markets are perfectly competitive and an adequate environment is ensured, the economy may still not reach its full potential. This is because of “market failures,” which typically happen in the presence of externalities. They are at play when firms and workers do not fully internalize the effects of their decisions on the broader economy and their dynamic implications. Typically, they are learning externalities, coordination failures, or information asymmetries (Rodrik 2005).

As argued by many, (e.g., Arrow 1962) and Matsuyama 1992) some activities entail higher productivity gains, or more learning potential, for an economy compared to other traditional activities such as non-tradable services or agriculture. Firms may not be fully aware of these productivity gains, leading to lower output in high-productivity sectors and lower relative incomes over time. The coordination failure is based on the idea that a critical size of the modern sector is needed for a firm to enter it. It would be profitable for a firm to invest in a modern sector only if there are enough firms investing simultaneously in other modern sectors. If many firms invest together in modern sectors, described as the “big push,” economy reaches a higher level of productivity and development (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943, Murphy et al. 1989). Lastly, information asymmetries exist if there is imperfect information about new markets and products, and firms underinvest as a result (Hausman and Rodrik 2003). This is clearly seen in firms trying to export and penetrate new geographical markets with their products.

In theory, tackling these externalities would necessitate a state intervention, broadly defined as industrial policy. However, the scope, the tools and whether it could in practice be superior to a more “laissez-faire” approach, leaving the outcome to unfettered competition, is the object of an ongoing debate. At the heart of the debate lies the definition of what constitutes a “modern” sector, which is conducive to productivity gains and spillovers to the rest of the economy. While it is typically associated with manufacturing (Matsuyama 1992 and Krugman 1987) or related to the concept of sophistication (Hausman, Hwang and Rodrik 2007 and Cherif and Hasanov 2019), others argue that service sectors could also play a role (IMF 2018). More important for inclusive growth, if a sector is to be targeted, it should help achieve broad-based growth to contribute to poverty alleviation. In practice it means that it should also generate (directly or indirectly) enough employment, and the level of skills to fill those jobs should be realistically met over the medium term.

The other key question relates to how state intervention to tackle externalities could curtail or distort competition. Indeed, state interventions of the past typically followed the model of import-substitution policies. The main idea was to protect domestic producers from international competition by imposing barriers to trade, such as high tariffs. In many cases, the curtailment of competition went further and encompassed the domestic market as countries relied on one or very few “champions” to achieve import-substitution goals. The many past failed cases in Latin America and the Middle East imply that such policies may be counterproductive in general (Cherif and Hasanov 2019). The comparison of Malaysia’s foray into automotive industry in the 1970s with its champion Proton to the success of Korea’s Hyundai is a case in point (Cherif and Hasanov 2019b). After decades of support and protection from domestic and international competition, Proton depended on imports of critical inputs, including the engine. The high tariffs to protect it also meant that consumers had to pay higher prices for lower quality products. In comparison, although Hyundai benefitted from state support as well, it was also forced early on to compete both on the domestic and international markets. It could be argued that competition provided Hyundai with an incentive to innovate and take advantage of economies of scale.

Moreover, support for firms could be pursued without necessarily implying less competition. Aghion and others (2015) develop a simple model showing that targeted subsidies can be used to induce several firms to operate in the same sector, and that the more competitive the sector is, the more it will induce firms to innovate in order to “escape competition” (Aghion et. al. 2005). Of course, a lot depends upon the design of industrial policy. Such policy should target sectors, not particular firms (Aghion 2016). Using Chinese firm-level panel data, Aghion and others (2015) look at the interaction between state subsidies to a sector and the level of product market competition in that sector. They show that TFP, TFP growth, and product innovation (defined as the ratio between output value generated by new products to total output value) are all positively correlated with the interaction between state aid to the sector and market competition in the sector. In other words, the more competitive the recipient sector is, the more positive the effects of targeted state subsidies to that sector are. Infact, for sectors with low degree of competition the effects are negative, whereas the effects become positive in sectors with sufficiently high degree of competition. Finally, the interaction between state aid and product market competition in the sector is more positive when state aid is less concentrated.

Yet, there are externalities that can be tackled without curtailing competition with the potential to have a sizable contribution to broad-based growth and poverty alleviation. These are typically related to informational asymmetries. Bloom and Van Reenen (2010), f or example, show that interventions to improve management practices in Indian small firms can significantly improve productivity. So did the productivity missions of the Marshall Plan in Europe after the WWII (Giorcelli 2019). In the same vein, Atkin et al. (2017) showed that Egyptian rug producers can be helped to access export markets by tackling informational asymmetries and coordination failures. In other words, they showed that interventions such as export promotion agencies can help SMEs advertise their products in foreign markets and act as a communication channel between them and customers. They also showed that export activities helped small producers improve their quality and value added which confirms the importance of export orientation. This focus on SMEs can help increase productivity and tackle inequality at the same time.

The trade-off between the benefits and costs of state intervention suggests that the way the state intervenes in the economy is crucial. This intervention needs to be cognizant of exacerbating government failures such as rent-seeking and corruption. Moreover, even if these interventions are successful in the sense that they create competitive industries and contribute to growth, they should avoid creating “islands” of relatively advanced sectors. If these sectors are disconnected from the rest of the economy, broad-based growth may not be sustained, and it would exacerbate inequality. For example, thanks to interventions and targeted policies, Costa Rica managed to foster a high-tech sector in electronics and health instruments (Spar 1998). Although it led to higher growth and declining poverty as well as productivity improvements in agricultural sectors, high inequality persisted while growth policies for inclusiveness were missing (Ferreira, Fuentes, and Ferreira 2018).

#### Growth is sustainable and solves a laundry list of threats.

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Discourse on food ethics often advocates the anti-capitalist idea that we need less capitalism, less growth, and less globalization if we want to make the world a better and more equitable place, with arguments focused on applications to food, globalization, and a just society. For example, arguments for this anti-capitalist view are at the core of some chapters in nearly every handbook and edited volume in the rapidly expanding subdiscipline of food ethics. None of these volumes (or any article published in this subdiscipline broadly construed) focuses on a defense of globalized capitalism.1

More generally, discourse on global ethics, environment, and political theory in much of academia—and in society—increasingly features this anti-capitalist idea as well.2 The idea is especially prominent in discourse surrounding the environment, climate, and global poverty, where we face a nexus of problems of which capitalism is a key driver, including climate change, air and water pollution, the challenge of feeding the world, ensuring sustainable development for the world's poorest, and other interrelated challenges.

It is therefore important to ask whether this anti-capitalist idea is justified by reason and evidence that is as strong as the degree of confidence placed in it by activists and many commentators on food ethics, global ethics, and political theory, more generally.

In fact, many experts argue that this anti-capitalist idea is not supported by reason and argument and is actually wrong. The main contribution of this essay is to explain the structure of the leading arguments against the anti-capitalist idea, and in favor of the opposite conclusion. I begin by focusing on the general argument in favor of well-regulated globalized capitalism as the key to a just, flourishing, and environmentally healthy world. This is the most important of all of the arguments in terms of its consequences for health, wellbeing, and justice, and it is endorsed by experts in the empirically minded disciplines best placed to analyze the issue, including experts in long-run global development, human health, wellbeing, economics, law, public policy, and other related disciplines. On the basis of the arguments outlined below, well-regulated capitalism has been endorsed by recent Democratic presidents of the United States such as Barack Obama, and by progressive Nobel laureates who have devoted their lives to human development and more equitable societies, as well as by a wide range of experts in government and leading nongovernmental organizations.

The goal of this essay is to make the structure and importance of these arguments clear, and thereby highlight that discourse on global ethics and political theory should engage carefully with them. The goal is not to endorse them as necessarily sound and correct. The essay will begin by examining general arguments for and against capitalism, and then turn to implications for food, the environment, climate change, and beyond.

Arguments for and against Forms of Capitalism

The Argument against Capitalism

Capitalism is often argued to be a key driver of many of society's ills: inequalities, pollution, land use changes, and incentives that cause people to live differently than in their ideal dreams. Capitalism can sometimes deepen injustices. These negative consequences are easy to see—resting, as they do, at the center of many of society's greatest challenges.3

And at the same time, it is often difficult to see the positive consequences of capitalism.4 What are the positive consequences of allowing private interests to clear-cut forests and plant crops, especially if those private interests are rich multinational corporations and the forests are in poor, developing countries whose citizens do not receive the profits from deforestation? Why give private companies the right to exploit resources at all, since exploitation almost always has some negative consequences such as those listed above? These are the right questions to ask, and they highlight genuine challenges to capitalism. And in light of these challenges, it is reasonable to consider the possibility that perhaps a different economic system altogether would be more equitable and beneficial to the global population.

The Argument for Well-Regulated Capitalism

However, things are more complicated than the arguments above would suggest, and the benefits of capitalism, especially for the world's poorest and most vulnerable people, are in fact myriad and significant. In addition, as we will see in this section, many experts argue that capitalism is not the fundamental cause of the previously described problems but rather an essential component of the best solutions to them and of the best methods for promoting our goals of health, well-being, and justice.

To see where the defenders of capitalism are coming from, consider an analogy involving a response to a pandemic: if a country administered a rushed and untested vaccine to its population that ended up killing people, we would not say that vaccines were the problem. Instead, the problem would be the flawed and sloppy policies of vaccine implementation. Vaccines might easily remain absolutely essential to the correct response to such a pandemic and could also be essential to promoting health and flourishing, more generally.

The argument is similar with capitalism according to the leading mainstream arguments in favor of it: Capitalism is an essential part of the best society we could have, just like vaccines are an essential part of the best response to a pandemic such as COVID-19. But of course both capitalism and vaccines can be implemented poorly, and can even do harm, especially when combined with other incorrect policy decisions. But that does not mean that we should turn against them—quite the opposite. Instead, we should embrace them as essential to the best and most just outcomes for society, and educate ourselves and others on their importance and on how they must be properly designed and implemented with other policies in order to best help us all. In fact, the argument in favor of capitalism is even more dramatic because it claims that much more is at stake than even what is at stake in response to a global pandemic—what is at stake with capitalism is nothing less than whether the world's poorest and most vulnerable billion people will remain in conditions of poverty and oppression, or if they will instead finally gain access to what is minimally necessary for basic health and wellbeing and become increasingly affluent and empowered. The argument in favor of capitalism proceeds as follows:

Premise 1. Development and the past. Over the course of recorded human history, the majority of historical increases in health, wellbeing, and justice have occurred in the last two centuries, largely as a result of societies adopting or moving toward capitalism. Capitalism is a relevant cause of these improvements, in the sense that they could not have happened to such a degree if it were not for capitalism and would not have happened to the same degree under any alternative noncapitalist approach to structuring society. The argument in support of this premise relies on observed relationships across societies and centuries between indicators of degree of capitalism, wealth, investments in public goods, and outcomes for health, wellbeing, and justice, together with econometric analysis in support of the conclusion that the best explanation of these correlations and the underlying mechanism is that large increases in health, wellbeing, and justice are largely driven by increasing investments in public goods. The scale of increased wealth necessary to maximize these investments requires capitalism. Thus, as capitalist societies have become dramatically wealthier over the past hundred years (and wealthier than societies with alternative systems), this has allowed larger investments in public goods, which simply has not been possible in a sustained way in societies without the greater wealth that capitalism makes possible. Important investments in public goods include investments in basic medical knowledge, in health and nutrition programs, and in the institutional capacity and know-how to regulate society and capitalism itself. As a result, capitalism is a primary driver of positive outcomes in health and wellbeing (such as increased life expectancy, lowered child and maternal mortality, adequate calories per day, minimized infectious disease rates, a lower percentage and number of people in poverty, and more reported happiness);5 and in justice (such as reduced deaths from war and homicide; higher rankings in human rights indices; the reduced prevalence of racist, sexist, homophobic opinions in surveys; and higher literacy rates).6 These quantifiable positive consequences of global capitalism dramatically outweigh the negative consequences (such as deaths from pollution in the course of development), with the result that the net benefits from capitalism in terms of health, wellbeing, and justice have been greater than they would have been under any known noncapitalist approach to structuring society.7

Premise 2. Economics, ethics, and policy. Although capitalism has often been ill-regulated and therefore failed to maximize net benefits for health, wellbeing, and justice, it can become well-regulated so that it maximizes these societal goals, by including mechanisms identified by economists and other policy experts that do the following:

* optimally8 regulate negative effects such as pollution and monopoly power, and invest in public goods such as education, basic healthcare, and fundamental research including biomedical knowledge (more generally, policies that correct the failures of free markets that economists have long recognized will arise from “externalities” in the absence of regulation);9
* ensure equity and distributive justice (for example, via wealth redistribution);10
* ensure basic rights, justice, and the rule of law independent of the market (for example, by an independent judiciary, bill of rights, property rights, and redistribution and other legislation to correct historical injustices due to colonialism, racism, and correct current and historical distortions that have prevented markets from being fair);11 and
* ensure that there is no alternative way of structuring society that is more efficient or better promotes the equity, justice, and fairness goals outlined above (by allowing free exchange given the regulations mentioned).12

To summarize the implication of the first two premises, well-regulated capitalism is essential to best achieving our ethical goals—which is true even though capitalism has certainly not always been well regulated historically. Society can still do much better and remove the large deficits in terms of health, wellbeing, and justice that exist under the current inferior and imperfect versions of capitalism.

Premise 3. Development and the future. If the global spread of capitalism is allowed to continue, desperate poverty can be essentially eliminated in our lifetimes. Furthermore, this can be accomplished faster and in a more just way via well-regulated global capitalism than by any alternatives. If we instead opt for less capitalism, less growth, and less globalization, then desperate poverty will continue to exist for a significant portion of the world's population into the further future, and the world will be a worse and less equitable place than it would have been with more capitalism. For example, in a world with less capitalism, there would be more overpopulation, food insecurity, air pollution, ill health, injustice, and other problems. In part, this is because of the factors identified by premise 1, which connect a turn away from capitalism with a turn away from continuing improvements in health, wellbeing, and justice, especially for the developing world. In addition, fertility declines are also a consequence of increased wealth, and the size of the population is a primary determinant of food demand and other environmental stressors.13 Finally, as discussed at length in the next section of the essay, capitalism can be naturally combined with optimal environmental regulations.14 Even bracketing anything like optimal regulation, it remains true that sufficiently wealthy nations reduce environmental degradation as they become wealthier, whereas developing nations that are nearing peak degradation will remain stuck at the worst levels of degradation if we stall growth, rather than allowing them to transition to less and less degradation in the future via capitalism and economic growth.15 In contrast, well-regulated capitalism is a key part of the best way of coping with these problems, as well as a key part of dealing with climate change, global food production, and other specific challenges, as argued at length in the next section. Here it is important to stress that we should favor well-regulated capitalism that includes correct investments in public goods over other capitalist systems such as the neoliberalism of the recent past that promoted inadequately regulated capitalism with inadequate concern for externalities, equity, and background distortions and injustices.16

Conclusion. Therefore, we should be in favor of capitalism over noncapitalism, and we should especially favor well-regulated capitalism, which is the ethically optimal economic system and is essential to any just basic structure for society.

This argument is impressive because, as stated earlier in the essay, it is based on evidence that is so striking that it leads a bipartisan range of open-minded thinkers and activists to endorse well-regulated capitalism, including many of those who were not initially attracted to the view because of a reasonable concern for the societal ills with which we began. To better understand why such a range of thinkers could agree that well-regulated capitalism is best, it may help to clarify some things that are not assumed or implied by the argument for it, which could be invoked by other bad arguments for capitalism.

One thing the argument above does not assume is that health, wellbeing, or justice are the same thing as wealth, because, in fact, they are not. Instead, the argument above relies on well-accepted, measurable indicators of health and wellbeing, such as increased lifespan; decreased early childhood mortality; adequate nutrition; and other empirically measurable leading indicators of health, wellbeing, and justice.17 Similarly, the argument that capitalism promotes justice, peace, freedom, human rights, and tolerance relies on empirical metrics for each of these.18

Furthermore, the argument does not assume that because these indicators of health, wellbeing, and justice are highly correlated with high degrees of capitalism, that therefore capitalism is the direct cause of these good outcomes. Rather, the analyses suggest instead that something other than capitalism is the direct cause of societal improvements (such as improvements in knowledge and technology, public infrastructure, and good governance), and that capitalism is simply a necessary condition for these improvements to happen.19 In other words, the richer a society is, the more it is able to invest in all of these and other things that are the direct causes of health, wellbeing, and justice. But, to maximize investment in these things societies need well-regulated capitalism.

As part of these analyses, it is often stressed that current forms of capitalism around the world are highly defective and must be reformed in the direction of well-regulated capitalism because they lack investments in public goods, such as basic knowledge, healthcare, nutrition, other safety nets, and good governance.20 In this way, an argument for a particular kind of progressive reformism is an essential part of the analyses that lead many to endorse the more general argument for well-regulated capitalism.

Although these analyses are nuanced, and appropriately so, it remains the case that the things that directly lead to health, wellbeing, and justice require resources, and the best path toward generating those resources is well-regulated capitalism. And on the flip side, according to the analyses behind premise 1 described above, an anti-capitalist system would not produce the resources that are needed, and would thus be a disaster, especially for the poorest billion people who are most desperately in need of the resources that capitalism can create and direct, to escape from extreme poverty.21

#### Extinction outweighs.

Seth D. Baum & Anthony M. Barrett 18. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. 2018. “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174–184.

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

### Off

CP

The United States federal government should facilitate and fully resource the establishment of national care infrastructures.

#### The CP transforms the liberal welfare state in ways that foster radical flourishing and interdependency.

Chatzidakis, et al, 20—Professor in the School of Business and Management, Royal Holloway (Andreas, with Jamie Hakim, Jo Littler, Catherine Rottenberg and Lynne Segal, writing collectively as The Care Collective, “Caring States,” *The Care Manifesto: The Politics of Interdependence*, Chapter 4, 677-805, Kindle, dml)

The state is a critical arena if we are to create any sort of universal care. States must cease to be places where the interests of corporate-driven patterns of economic growth predominate, as these routinely rest upon deepening inequality, including embedded ethno-nationalism. Instead, their first and ultimate responsibility should be to build and maintain their own sustainable infrastructures of care. This means turning the current priorities of most nation states on their head.

A caring state is one in which notions of belonging are based on a recognition of our mutual interdependencies, rather than on ethno-cultural identity and racialised borders defended in the name of national security. It is one in which the provision for all of our basic needs is assured while, at the same time, it caters to the health of the environment and deepens participatory democracy at every level. The caring state is only successful inasmuch as it nurtures every human being and other living creatures within its bounds. And while no state can ever completely eliminate human aggression, relations of domination, or natural and human-made disasters, a caring state provides the conditions in which the vast majority of people can, nevertheless, not only survive but thrive.

First and foremost, a caring state must resource all the structures that facilitate the well-being and foster the capabilities or sustainability of all human and non-human life within its domain. For this to happen, we must transform the way belonging and citizenship operate within current state borders. For many countries, such as the US, this will often mean taking the lead from the struggles of Indigenous and First Nations People. In line with Canada’s Leap Manifesto, we argue that there must not only be recognition of past atrocities but also a reckoning with and some form of reparation for them, whether genocide, slavery and/ or dispossession. This will, of necessity, entail a process of decolonisation and the reclamation of stolen lands as well as stolen lives. It will also include reassessing how histories of imperialism and inequality are narrated in public heritage spaces and educational institutions. Only by confronting the past and prioritising the needs of those who have been most marginalised, violated and negated by uncaring nation states will we be able to move forward into a juster future and cultivate a radically different way of relating to others and the world itself.

States, in short, need urgently to build a care infrastructure based upon a recognition of our profound interdependencies and vulnerabilities, while putting the necessary material, social, and cultural conditions in place for the mutual thriving of all. Can this be done? It can, but first we must rethink the earlier, Keynesian welfare model.

The Welfare State and Its Discontents

We often hear resentment expressed towards the older generation of so-called baby boomers, the ‘lucky generation’. It was this generation that largely benefited from the expanding post-war welfare state, following the New Deal in the US and William Beveridge’s promise, in his famous 1942 Report, to provide care and support for everybody ‘from cradle to grave’. Influenced by Keynesian economics, with its warning that markets could not be relied upon to regulate themselves, the new post-war consensus generated widespread support for far-reaching extension of social services and state resources. This happened despite the fact that many European governments were near bankrupt as a result of the war. During this period, in many countries in the Global North, the state was understood to be responsible for facilitating the well-being of its citizens and for improving social infrastructures, while helping to ensure decent lives for all – whatever the shortcomings in practice, particularly in relation to racialised subjects and the realities (and eventual legacies) of colonialism. By the 1950s, for instance, 20 per cent of the British economy was publicly owned, including most essential services such as transport, energy and other key industries, and by 1979 almost half the British population lived in council housing, with the gap between the richest and poorest lower than ever before.

Similar policies were pursued across much of the Western world, supported by higher levels of progressive taxation. In the UK, the pioneer of British social policy, Richard Titmuss, insisted on the importance of universal benefits, conceived as entitlements, to ensure all citizens had an equal interest in the state, while judging gross inequalities to be both ‘morally wrong and corrosive of a healthy society’. In popular radio broadcasts, the British psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott highlighted the fact of human dependency, stressing the essential importance of ‘holding environments’ for the child, which fed into ideas about the significance of caring welfare states through support for mothers and the provision of decent homes and welfare services. 1

Rethinking the Keynesian Welfare State

A state organised around care would adopt many of the initial post-1945 welfare promises, while working to eliminate the inherently sexist, racist, hierarchical premises and manifestations of that time, and combating the anti-immigrant xenophobia still so evident today. A caring state will always begin by valuing caretaking over profit-making, and champion caretaking as a highly valued end in itself. Our vision of a caring state is one in which each life is understood to have intrinsic value and where belonging is not defined over and against a racialised or subordinated other. The caring state ensures high-quality and flexible care that is predominantly free at the point of use during all stages of life, from infancy to old age. It provides as well as ensures affordable housing and shared public and cultural spaces for all, along with high-quality public schooling, vocational training, university education and healthcare. A caring state recognises that its infrastructure as well as its day-to-day functioning depend on a myriad of skills and competencies.

All education and vocational training needs to emphasise care and caretaking practices, developing the capabilities of each person to hone their caring skills, while insisting that learning is about enhancing old as well as discovering new ways to nurture life and the world – whether in the sciences, humanities, carpentry or cooking. Indeed, from early on the caring state cultivates everyone’s capacity to care by providing relevant education and the necessary conditions for mutual thriving. Such attempts were not only pioneered in those community nurseries set up by feminists in the 1970s, but, as we’ve seen, over the years have been the focus of disability rights activists and mental health users. Furthermore, once caring and practices of caretaking become the organising principle of states, mental health issues will wane. Much of the misery of our times is inextricably linked to the entrenchment of neoliberalism, the gig economy and a growing sense of precarity among the 99 per cent. The caring state would produce substantive solutions to the growing mental health crisis, rather than inadequate sticking plasters. We need radical and systemic transformation.

Given our interdependencies, each and every citizen of the caring state must be recognised as having something of significance and value to contribute at every stage of life. Thus, a transformation of cultural norms goes hand in hand with the state’s avowal of everybody’s intrinsic dependency, with autonomy and dependency seen as two sides of the same coin.

Significantly rethinking the welfare state in this way also moves us well beyond the traditional domestic and gendered division of labour, since both the need to care and the need for care are understood to be shared by all. This is why rethinking the welfare state is also about rethinking how public provision is conceived and distributed. The caring state is precisely not a paternal, racist or settler-colonial state. Public provision in the caring state does not revolve around deepening dependencies but rather enables everyone to cultivate what disability studies have called ‘strategic autonomy and independence’, while creating the conditions that allow for new relationships within and among the state and its diverse communities – relationships predicated on everyone receiving what they need both to thrive and to participate in democratic practices.

In other words, the state, while necessary to manage the smooth provision of services and resources that enable communities and caring markets to thrive, must also be responsible for facilitating more, rather than less, democratic participation. A caring state is not a vertical, top-down, disciplinary or coercive one, but instead facilitates what Davina Cooper calls ‘the creative, horizontal and ecological tending of present and future’. 2 A caring state necessarily works in the vein of social justice rather than criminal justice, learning the lessons of abolitionist feminism to build supportive communities rather than privatised systems of incarceration. It also imaginatively encourages ‘common uses and spaces’ by providing open institutions and resources which can be overseen by citizens through participatory democratic processes, such as citizens’ assemblies. The caring state, in short, ensures the resourcing necessary for promiscuous care alongside caring communities to thrive.

There is copious evidence that democratically controlled, collectively resourced public services produce greater satisfaction than profit-seeking, commercialised services. 3 They significantly reduce inequality and secure broader solidarity and support, whatever the tensions they might also generate. A caring state is therefore one that provides the conditions allowing for such tensions, disagreements and ambivalences to emerge, since this encourages deliberation and concerted action. This means fostering institutions, norms, and communities that are well resourced and thus best positioned to enable us to work through at least some of the tensions of routine caring interactions. Consequently, state provision of care services is not enough without transforming its modes of delivery.

A caring infrastructure also entails shorter hours in paid work, to allow adequate time as well as resources for people to expand their capacity to care, whether in familial or any other caretaking settings. The best of hands-on care requires the time to slow down and maintain relational continuity while patiently taking stock of others in order to enable those being cared for to use or develop whatever scope they have for personal agency and well-being. This is why shorter working hours – as popularised by the campaign for the four-day week – is also key to facilitating the conditions that can educate and expand our capacities for caring, encouraging mutual participation in democratic deliberations as an integral part of the provision or need for care. 4 Once care is prioritised in this way, it becomes easier to find ways to recognise and try to meet our shifting dependencies, assisting those who need to develop or gain control over capabilities others can take for granted.

From Welfare State to Caring State

Facing collapsing infrastructures and calamities of care and livelihoods, there have already been moves to rethink policies and practices in certain cities and municipalities, although rarely on a national level. Some administrative regions have begun to offer more support for co-operative grassroots initiatives for jobs and services, both little and large, as we saw pioneered in Cleveland in the US and more recently in Preston in the UK. With homelessness a pressing problem of our time, assistance with community housing projects has also been growing, while the exemplary Social Services and Wellbeing Act passed in Wales in 2014 specifically requires local authorities to promote the development of community and user-owned services. Such modes of care can in principle not only encourage less bureaucratic and more flexible targeted services and support, but help build that vital sense of solidarity, agency, community and belonging necessary for sustaining resource building and caretaking. We can learn from and build on examples such as these. A caring state would facilitate and help resource precisely these kinds of horizontal and community-oriented projects, ensuring affordable and decent housing for all, while the relationships between the different levels and scales of governance would, of necessity, be ones of mutual responsibility but also – and crucially – subjected to continual debate and reflection.

The idea that we are all entitled to equal access to public resources when we need them will not banish all of our fears surrounding fragility and dependence. But it is the only way to lessen these fears and nurture belief in our shared humanity and interdependence, whatever our pluralities and shifting needs, especially those we have been encouraged to disavow and disparage. Insisting on such priorities would offer reassurance that those we care most about could always find forms of support, even if we cannot provide it ourselves. Above all, prioritising care would also offer the vast comfort of knowing we live in a world that is capable of valuing all living things within it and, just as importantly, that works to repair and replenish the resources we rely upon, whether ecological, manufactured orself-fashioned.

Such a world clearly rids us of old forms of state paternalism with its gendered, ethnic and racial exploitations, challenging ingrained and recently mounting ethno-nationalism by creating more porous borders for the movement of people, while deepening democratic practices on all levels of society. The caring state therefore not only builds and cultivates an infrastructure of care from cradle to grave, it also engenders new conceptions of belonging, citizenship, and rights through necessarily providing for the basic needs of all. A caring state is ultimately based on a sense of solidarity towards all its inhabitants, while also enabling what Joan Tronto calls ‘caring with’, the idea that citizens should care not only for other citizens but for democracy itself.

Thus, belonging, citizenship, and rights must all be organised around the principle of care rather than by birthplace, identity or national territorial claims, so that a commitment to care will be the only pledge of allegiance necessary to live in the caring state’s domain. Too many of those who have provided and continue to provide the bulk of caring work in wealthier countries have been denied citizenship, even though they sometimes arrived as children. This was the case in the recent Windrush scandal in Britain, where West Indian migrants who had lived in the UK since childhood were unlawfully detained, denied legal rights and in some cases deported in the ‘hostile environment’ imposed by the Home Office. In contrast, new notions of caring citizens and citizenship would not only help atone for these and other past violations but completely alter our present and future notions of belonging.

This is not an impossible dream. Here, as with notions of belonging, we have much to learn from the history of Indigenous struggle against settler colonialism and extractive capitalism. In the fight against the Dakota Access Pipeline, for instance, Indigenous nations from across North America and beyond established the treaty camps at Standing Rock. Despite a devastating history of genocide and serial betrayals by the US government, the camp was not exclusive to Native Americans. Anyone was welcome so long as they adhered to the values of the camp, which included a commitment to protect the water and Mother Earth. As the historian Nick Estes states, whatever their shortcomings, the treaty camps offered a vision for an alternative future. There, ‘free food, free education, free health care, free legal aid, a strong sense of community, safety, and security were guaranteed to all.’ 5 In other words, they were designed according to need, not profit. The camps were built on caretaking and enshrined a radically different vision of belonging, as well as of relating to other people and the world.

Through the creation and resourcing of a caring infrastructure, rejecting all past and current state violence, states can and must be transformed. This will involve giving priority to those who have historically been most marginalised, and recognising the right of every inhabitant of the state to care and be cared for in all care’s various meanings and manifestations. Adopting some of the premises of post-war welfare states, but refusing their traditional racialised policies, rigid hierarchies and sexual and racial divisions of labour, our progressive vision of states would undermine the conditions that produce economic and environmental refugees and migrants. Indeed, if care were to become the organising principle of all states across the globe, economic inequality and mass migration would decrease and environmental injustice would be rectified through our mutual commitment to caring for the world. Ultimately, then, our caring imaginaries must move away from only caring for one’s own, towards the community-building of radical municipalism and nation states, ending with caring for the furthest reaches of our interconnected planet. Making this a reality necessarily involves rethinking and tackling our uncaring economies.

### Case---1NC

#### Vote Neg on presumption---their method does nothing to change dominant discourses or structures that perpetuate violence. Their challenge to this has no means of spilling outside of debate, which is necessary for them to solve any of their impacts---their belief that it does is cruel optimism, which turns case.

#### The ballot is not key to their strategy---they can’t explain why voting Aff in the doubles produces any valuable change.

#### Their method is a band aid on a bullet wound.

Sandweiss-Back, 20 - Program Coordinator at the Kairos Center for Religions, Rights, and Social Justice ( Noam, ‘Beyond Mutual Aid: Toward the Poor Organizing the Poor’, 2020, <https://kairoscenter.org/beyond-mutual-aid/> )//hecht

Today, we confront another economic collapse amid a vicious pandemic. In the last six weeks, we’ve witnessed the accelerated redistribution of wealth from the poor to the most rich. The government has funneled trillions of dollars into Wall Street, while the recent stimulus packages still don’t provide tens of millions of people with paid sick leave, sustained financial support, healthcare and housing protections, and more. These millions are now lining up behind the 140 million who were already poor or one emergency away from poverty. This multitude must protect themselves and their communities in the shadow of a government that has abandoned them in ways that strikingly echo the Hoover administration. Within this context, many have turned to the idea of mutual aid. Community groups and ad-hoc neighborhood associations are springing up to coordinate the sharing of food and supplies; nonprofits are funneling their shrinking budgets toward direct service projects; online organizations are offering virtual trainings; even Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez has shared a “how-to” guide on the subject. The lengths to which people are laboring to take care of one another during this crisis is inspiring and necessary. All across the country, we are seeing the truth: that poor and dispossessed people, as well as all those now awakened to a new kind of precarity, will not wait to be saved, but will, as always, take lifesaving action born out of necessity. As long as this crisis rages, there will be people who do the necessary work of triage, of meeting immediate needs in the present, and this work is critical. But in the face of a brutal and increasingly volatile system, mutual aid as it is generally being conceived may be a bandaid, rather than a strategy to win what every person needs in order to live. For many concerned citizens, the response to this moment has been to emulate a non-profit service model for those most at risk. This is a position of stop-gap charity that takes care of a small number of people, but does little to address the deeper source of pain for so many. For others, mutual aid has become a project of rejecting and resisting the state and its decrepit and hateful institutions; this is a posture that claims that no one is coming to save us, that our communities have all that we need, and that we can somehow transform our conditions by coming together through networks of social solidarity. In both cases, good people are doing brave work and some are receiving emergency relief because of it. But mutual aid at this level makes no claim on the state and no counterattack toward capital to solve the problem of this pandemic and the economic crisis beneath it. Over the past fifty years, the ruling class has mounted devastating attacks on public institutions and services, from privatized healthcare and education to the evisceration of the social safety net. Meanwhile, the economy has undergone a technological revolution, and with it our society has been (re)constructed in the image of global capital. We’ve seen the hollowing out of the state and the forfeiture of many of its functions to non-profits, the private sector, and the free market. We’ve been made increasingly dependent on market-based solutions that lionize billionaires and trumpet apolitical acts of service. Now, in this moment of crisis, we do what we can to salvage our communities, often using the same models, while corporations are celebrated for their humanitarianism even as they reap the rewards of federal relief. Neoliberal capitalism and decades of austerity measures have conditioned generations of us to ignore or lose faith in the possibility of the state as a site for organized struggle. But it will take the resources of our government and of governments around the world to not only overcome the coronavirus, but to fundamentally change our lives for the better.

#### Disability must be politically directed. Disengagement causes catastrophic backsliding that worsens material conditions.

McGreevy 20 [Nora McGreevy is a daily correspondent for Smithsonian. She is also a freelance journalist based in Chicago whose work has appeared in Wired, Washingtonian, the Boston Globe, South Bend Tribune, the New York Times and more. "The ADA Was a Monumental Achievement 30 Years Ago, but the Fight for Equal Rights Continues." https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/history-30-years-since-signing-americans-disabilities-act-180975409/]

For disability rights leader [Judy Heumann](https://twitter.com/judithheumann), the tumult of 2020—first the COVID-19 pandemic, then a reignited movement against racial injustice—underscores just how much work remains to be done.

“Everything’s kind of being thrown into the pot right now, right?” she says.

Heumann has been at the forefront of the fight for equality for disabled Americans. She relishes the hard-won successes but has no misconceptions about how looking back at 30 years since the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was signed on July 26, 1990, much progress still has to be made.

That day, the United States became the first country to pass comprehensive protections for the basic civil rights of people with disabilities, outlawing discrimination against individuals with disabilities in schools, employment, transportation and other key parts of public life. The ADA would also remake the physical environment of the country by mandating accessibility in public spaces—entry ramps, Braille on signs, automatic doors, curb cuts and lifts on city buses and other measures that make it easier for the more than [61 million Americans](https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2018/p0816-disability.html) living with disabilities to participate fully in society.

Heumann, who contracted polio as a baby and has used a wheelchair most of her life, grew up in Brooklyn, where the local public school refused to let her attend because of her disability. Protections for the civil rights of people with disabilities in those days were limited—neither the 1964 Civil Rights Act nor the 1965 Voting Rights Act had included people with disabilities as a protected class.

Her first foray into activism came in 1970, when Heumann sued the Board of Education of the City of New York to become the city’s first teacher who uses a wheelchair. She later moved to Berkeley, California, where she worked alongside activist [Ed Roberts](https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/ed-roberts-wheelchair-records-story-obstacles-overcome-180954531/) at the Center for Independent Living, a pioneering home for people with disabilities founded on the principles of community and self-empowerment.

In 1977, she, fellow activists Kitty Cone, Brad Lomax and others led a grueling sit-in at a federal building in San Francisco to demand that the government enforce Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which stated that federally funded organizations could not discriminate against people with disabilities. (The new Netflix documentary Crip Camp, produced by Barack and Michelle Obama, includes inspiring documentary footage of the protest.)

The 504 sit-in united Americans with different kinds of disabilities—people who were hearing or visually impared, or who used wheelchairs or had mental disabilities—in an unprecedented way, Heumann says. “It empowered us,” she recalls. “Simply put, we were slowly moving from being a rag-tag, unorganized group of disabled people … to a cross-disability movement. We were really recognizing that it was possible for us to envision a day when barriers of discrimination could be torn down… Without the voices of disabled individuals, we would not have gotten 504, the way it ultimately came out, nor would we have been able to get the ADA.”

When President George H.W. Bush finally signed the ADA in 1990, he was flanked by some of the key people who helped its passage, including Justin Dart Jr., the vice chair of the National Council on Disability, who had embarked on an epic nationwide tour to advocate for the legislation just years earlier.

“When it was passed and signed, there was a huge ceremony because it was seen as this amazing national moment, even though the law was imperfect,” says Katherine Ott, the curator in the division of science and medicine at the Smithsonian’s National Museum of American History. “At the moment, it was one of the happiest days in the 20th century for people with disabilities.”

In the three decades that followed, a new generation of Americans with disabilities, known as the “ADA generation,” grew up in a world where their basic rights were protected by the law. But the ADA has its limits.

Thirty years later, experts say that many of the ADA’s promises of universal accessibility have not come to pass—in part because laws like Section 504 and the ADA are predicated on someone litigating, explains Beth Ziebarth, who directs Access Smithsonian, the branch of the Smithsonian Institution that works to make its museums, zoo and research centers accessible to all.

“The mechanism for actually implementing the ADA, in many respects, is the process of somebody with a disability filing a complaint about the lack of accessibility,” Ziebarth says. “That leads to spotty compliance across the country.”

For instance, Heumann notes that air travel—an industry not covered by the ADA—has become “worse and worse” for people with disabilities over the years, particularly when it comes to getting motorized wheelchairs in and out of cargo pits. Technology companies, too, often lag behind in providing accessibility measures for users with disabilities—contributing to what’s known as the “digital divide,” she says.

“The ADA is a very important piece of legislation. But even if it were being implemented as effectively as possible, it still doesn’t address other issues that disabled people are facing,” Heumann says.

Issues of representation for all people with disabilities—and particularly people of color—are now more a part of the conversation than ever. When protests against racial injustice erupted across the country in May after the killing of George Floyd, many disability activists were quick to point out how issues of disability rights and civil rights for African Americans are interconnected, and sometimes overlooked. Studies estimate that one-third to one-half of black Americans killed by the police are experiencing episodes of mental illness or have a disability, although no national database exists to track those statistics, as reporter Abigail Abrams reported for Time last month.

In June, South Carolina-based disability rights activist Vilissa Thompson watched snapshots of the Black Disabled Lives Matter marches in Washington D.C. flood her timeline. “It was really incredible to see,” Thompson says.

At 34 years old, Thompson, who is black and uses a wheelchair, feels lucky to have grown up with the ADA. But the disability movement must also reckon with racism, inclusivity and an intersectional understanding of race and disability, she says.

“If you’re going to talk about black liberation or freedom, disability rights have to be involved in the story, and vice versa,” Thompson says.

On her website, Ramp Your Voice, Thompson has written extensively about black leaders in the Disability Rights Movement whose stories are often left out of the historical narrative, activists like Brad Lomax, who played a pivotal role in the 504 Sit-In by connecting activists with the Black Panther Party, which provided hot meals to the people stuck in the federal building.

In 2016, Thompson started the hashtag #DisabilityTooWhite to draw attention to media stories that center white disabled people, which continues to be used to this day: “We have to understand that black disabled folks have always been a part of both movements, the disability rights movement and the civil rights movement, whether they get acknowledgement or not,” she says.

Apart from the noteworthy anniversary, the ADA made news over a conflation of who and what the ADA specifically protects. A fake badge appropriating the ADA as an excuse to avoid wearing face masks—a claim that the Department of Justice disavowed—has blossomed on Facebook and Twitter during the COVID-19 pandemic.

“Inappropriate use of the ADA is not uncommon,” Thompson says. “It’s upsetting that people are using the ADA in this way to avoid responsibility and what they can do during this time. It’s a grotesque misuse of the mandate.”

Individuals with disabilities who also have underlying chronic illness are likely at higher risk of severe illness from COVID-19, and those living in nursing homes or institutions face higher risks of transmission, Heumann points out. Workers with disabilities have also been disproportionately affected by the financial fallout of the national shutdown, according to initial studies.

The pandemic also brought deep-rooted disparities in medical care against people with disabilities to the fore: in March, for instance, disability rights groups in Washington and Alabama filed complaints against state ventilator rationing plans, as Minyvonne Burke reported for NBC News at the time. These plans suggested that medical professionals could chose to not use ventilators on patients with disabilities in the case of a shortage.

“It was shades of the eugenics issue all over again,” Ziebarth says, referring to the long history of forced sterilization and euthanasia that Americans with disabilities endured, particularly in the late 19th century and early 20th centuries. “That’s kind of a scary reality: we’re not far away from everything going back to where it was in the early 1900s.”

For Ziebarth, it reveals how fragile hard-won progress can be. “We realize that it’s really important for the younger generations to understand that your rights can be taken away from you,” Ziebarth says. “We need to be vigilant. Otherwise we can lose everything that people fought so hard for.”

#### Mutual aid replicates violent market logics.

Julie NELSON Global Development and Environment @ Tufts ‘6 *Economics for Humans* p. 37-40

Problems with the Market-Critic Prescriptions

At the end of the last chapter, I brought up evidence of poverty and corporate abuses that raise questions about the adequacy of the probusiness, free-market prescription for curing social ills. Do the prescriptions of the market critics for “small is beautiful/’“government to the rescue,” or “separate spheres” solutions give us grounds for more hope?

The “small is beautiful” prescription contains, of course, some truth. It is true that acting ethically is a more complicated process the larger and more complex the level of organization involved. Likewise, the “government to the rescue” advocates make some good points. It is easier for any one company to do the right thing if there is public pressure on all companies to do the right thing, and a government regulation can be a good tool for applying such pressure. On an even larger scale, international public agreements may be the only hope for addressing global climate change issues. These are far too big for any one nation, let alone one company, to take on. And there is some truth in the “separate spheres” view. There are some social welfare problems for which private, market solutions don’t work. Care for people who are poor and ill or otherwise needy cannot be provided on a purely market basis. The funds have to come from somewhere other than the “consumers” of the services. Public or private nonprofit allocations of money are necessary.

But while the values held in high regard by market critics are praiseworthy, and the prescriptions contain partial truths, I find the prescribed solutions lacking when held up to criteria of realism and effectiveness. Sometimes the proposed solutions could cause real damage.

A first problem is that these views tend to assume not only that the market sphere is driven exclusively by self-interest, but that self-interest is exclusive to the market sphere. They often seem to assume that if an organization is small, or nonprofit, or governmental, then non-self-interested motivations can be trusted to take over. We should consider the evidence on this.

Families, for example, are very small nonprofit organizations, presumably governed by interests of love and intimacy (as in the Victorian image).The newspaper reminds us daily, however, that families can also be characterized by domination and abuse, even violence. Sometimes being in a small-scale organization just means being under the thumb of a small-scale oppressor.

Community organizing is a great way to bring a group together to work on issues of social concern and to create opportunities for activism. Community organizing was very effective in South Boston in the 1970s, for instance, when big community demonstrations were organized to fight racial integration of the local public schools. Sometimes community groups carry out agendas of racism. And it is not uncommon for community activists motivated by not-in-my-backyard sentiments to try to push undesirable projects off on some other community. Communities, like individuals, can act in purely self-interested ways.

Nonprofit and religious organizations can bring people together to work for goals other than profit.The Boston diocese of the Catholic Church, for example, is legally not allowed to be motivated by profit. It was the maintenance of its own institutional hierarchies and reputation that motivated it to quietly move priests who sexually abused children from one parish to another, thereby supplying the abusers with fresh victims. Nonprofit institutions—even those ostensibly concerned with maintaining moral and spiritual values—are not immune to evil.

In an era of suspicious elections, campaign finance fiascos, and powerful lobbyists, one has to be naive in the extreme to believe that governments can be trusted to automatically or naturally work for the common good.

Appeals to small communities, nonprofits, or governments to take over economic activities “in the public interest” seem to me to bring in a deus ex machina solution.Yes, it would be nice if it worked. But how do we know that those selfish motivations critics assume drive the market are not also going to show up in families, community organizations, nonprofits, and the state?

A second problem with these views is that they largely pull the rug out from under their own noble drives. Because money and power are associated with greed and oppression, money and power are treated as inherently morally suspect. People who possess these, such as corporate executives who might be willing to engage in ethical discussion (if given the chance), are labeled as the evil “them,” separated by a large gulf from the moral “us.” Thus, potential allies and power bases are eliminated. This aversion to money and power has, I believe, been especially damaging to the sectors of the economy in which hands-on care is provided to children, the sick, and the elderly. Remember this poster: “It will be a great day when the schools have all the money they need and the air force has to hold a bake sale to buy a bomber”? How true. But the antimoney ideology reinforces exactly the bake-sale, nickel-and-dime mentality for human services that that poster decried. The damage this attitude has inflicted on caring work will be taken up further when I look at issues of money and motivations in chapter 4. A third problem is that, even if the prescriptions given by market critics were viable once put in place, there would still remain the problem of getting there. The massive promarket tide now flooding the United States and global institutions presents an intimidating reality check. The “small is beautiful” view tells us that we must have a massive economic restructuring— the thorough destruction of large corporations as a form of economic organization—before we can really be human in our economic lives. This would require a gargantuan change— larger, perhaps, than the Industrial Revolution and the rise and fall of Communism combined. If, on the other hand, we hope to be rescued by the rise of powerful, purely public-spirited interventionist governments, the current political climate makes it look like we may be waiting a very long time. Every step toward wresting control away from those with money and power will, market critics correctly perceive, be resisted by those with money and power.

Some people enjoy tilting at the economic machine—or at windmills, like Don Quixote in his hopeless crusades. In fact, I admire the spirit of people who keep to their praiseworthy, treasured values against all odds. But what if the futures envisioned by market critics, visions that tend to seesaw between the utopian and apocalyptic, are not the only options? What if the proposed solutions are unsatisfactory because the market critics have, unfortunately, combined good values with erroneous “facts” about what an economy is?

#### It lapses into Reagan-era politics.

Harcourt 20 (Bernard E. Harcourt, Professor of Law and Political Science, Columbia University, “For Coöperation and the Abolition of Capital, Or, How to Get Beyond Our Extractive Punitive Society and Achieve a Just Society,” Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 14-672, 9-1-2020, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3702010)

The theory of mutual aid can sometimes elide the structural failures that are the root cause of the problems that give rise to the very need for mutual aid. At other times, the concept of mutual aid comes too close to charitable work. It is problematic, for instance, that some proponents glorify mutual aid, arguing that it works better than state or top-down measures, and as a result (1) ignore the fact that the problems are the product of indifference and structural racism, poverty, classism, and gender discrimination, and (2) suggest that we would all be better off with no state interventions. Dean Spade gets to this in his essay, “Solidarity, Not Charity,” when he argues that most of the media stories about recent mutual aid efforts elide the structural causes of the problems; and when he argues that they feed into the rhetoric of small government.312

Another concern with mutual aid is that it only really addresses one small or tiny segment of coöperation, the sector that relates to charitable works, non-profit service, or what might be called public service—altruistic projects aimed at relieving the immediate effects of poverty and hunger and sickness. This raises several problems.

First, it has an anarchist bent that may be detrimental to coöperation: the impetus and force of coöperatives and mutuals may well be that the individual workers and members drive the enterprise, and in this sense, many of these initiatives are bottom-up or grass-roots; but that does not signify in any way that there is no need for an organizational mechanism or regulatory framework to administer and ensure the smooth functioning of these initiatives. Coöperationism is not anarchism. It may devalue the dirigiste elements of the state (by, among other things, placing ultimate decision-making in the hands of elected members of coöperatives), but it does not do away with the state necessarily.

Second, it takes a part for the whole: mutual aid is just one type of coöperationist enterprise, and it fits alongside housing and worker coöperatives, credit unions, mutuals, etc. Each one of these types of enterprise will have their own unique features. Mutual aid may appear to require less state intervention than worker coöperatives, but that is only because state regulation is often so hidden. It is pervasive in the mutual aid context: the state licenses food services and has OSHA regulations for the groceries where Invisible Hands’ Elkind shopped (Fairway Markets), as well as all kinds of worker and other regulations, FDA etc. And these differ from the kinds of regulations that would be necessary for banking through credit unions. Each one of these will need their own conceptualization, and we could never say that “mutual aid” governs those other areas—that makes far too many assumptions and simplifications about coöperationism.

Third, mutual aid does not really address root causes, despite its oft-repeated claims: these mutual aid projects are more temporary remedies, than solutions to the problems. They are valiant forms of self-help, but they depend on some of us having enough money to volunteer and shop for others, for instance in the Invisible Hands initiative. They build solidarity and reorient our moral compass—all good—but do not resolve the structural problems that give rise to capitalist exploitation. When Tolentino writes in the New Yorker that “Both mutual aid and charity address the effects of inequality, but mutual aid is aimed at root causes—at the structures that created inequality in the first place,”313 I have to disagree. Other forms of coöperation will get at the root causes, but not the mutual aid projects. Tolentino links in the article to the Big Door Brigade.314 The Big Door Brigade is a project that Dean Spade has been involved with. 315 On its website, built by and maintained by him, Dean Spade explains:

Mutual aid is when people get together to meet each other’s basic survival needs with a shared understanding that the systems we live under are not going to meet our needs and we can do it together RIGHT NOW! Mutual aid projects are a form of political participation in which people take responsibility for caring for one another and changing political conditions, not just through symbolic acts or putting pressure on their representatives in government, but by actually building new social relations that are more survivable. Most mutual aid projects are volunteer-based, with people jumping in to participate because they want to change what is going on right now, not wait to convince corporations or politicians to do the right thing.316

To be sure, mutual aid embraces a notion of people building new social relations and taking matters in their own hands and taking responsibility; but that is not the equivalent, I would argue, to addressing the structural problems of capitalist exploitation (unless, backing up to the first point, you are an anarchist). So again, more needs to be added to really address the root problems.

This is not to impugn mutual aid in any way. There is a long and admirable history to mutual aid that goes back to the Black Panther Party’s free-breakfast program in the United States in the 1960s and well before; and that extends to ongoing initiatives like the groups that leave water in the desert for immigrants crossing the border (the No More Deaths collective).317 There is a strong parallel between mutual aid and Occupy Wall Street: the idea of prefiguring another form of democracy. Kaba talks about the practice of mutual aid as “prefiguring the world in which we want to live.”318 That was, as you will recall, a constant refrain of Occupy and of Judith Butler’s work on assembly.319

But mutual aid is only one small dimension of a society built on coöperation, one dimension which has its own peculiarities. It should not be built up to represent the whole. For one thing, it simply does not constitute a viable economic system for production and growth. Contemporary coöperationist enterprises do.

#### It ought to remain open to legal tactics.

Delgado and Stefancic, 20—John J. Sparkman Chair of Law AND Professor and Clement Research Affiliate at the University of Alabama School of Law (Richard and Jean, “Radical Method,” 24 U.C. Davis Soc. Just. L. Rev. 3 (2020), dml)

As mentioned, sometimes showing that your toaster has an imperfect warranty will lead you to suspect that the toaster itself is probably defective, so that you should choose a better one next time. The same caution applies in connection with our system of civil liberties. One area of civil liberties protection that is shot through with carve-outs is the right to be free from forceful, nonconsensual police interrogation and torture. 82 Noticing that many environments are inherently coercive, scholars like Devon Carbado,83 David Cole,84 and Barry Feldss have demanded changes in the way we think about police-civilian interactions. Today, the police are somewhat more cautious about interrogating particular suspects, such as juveniles or drivers of color, than they were in former times, and even the government has given occasional thought to abolishing extraordinary rendition, waterboarding, and Guantanamo. 86

2. An example of A Far-Left Option Employed to Achieve a Civil Rights Breakthrough

As incarceration mounted and the jails began to fill up with black men, Paul Butler proposed a means by which black jurors may sometimes throw a wrench into the machinery of state. 87 He resurrected an ancient remedy, jury nullification, that can enable a black juror to avoid convicting a black defendant whom the juror believes would be more useful to the black community free than behind bars.88 Jury nullification emerged as an affirmative tool, based on ancient law, that the minority community can deploy to slow the rush to incarcerate. Currently, radical scholars and community activists are exploring alternatives for cash bail,89 devising new arguments for racial reparations based on reinterpretation of history,9 0 and making new/old arguments for open borders. 91 The radical or far-left, then, is a potential source of both negative and positive options for social change.

Conclusion

Once one realizes that the establishment frequently has little intention of carrying through on its promises, one is free of unwarranted reliance on a system that is full of implicit exceptions and is then free to take steps toward real relief.9 2 That relief may sometimes arrive as a result of ingenious lawyering that lands in front of a sympathetic judge at the right time.9 3 If not, it may take tens of thousands of children clamoring for a better future to get everyone's attention. 9 4

Alternatively, aid may arrive from the other direction, in the form of a radical new/old proposal put forward by a genius like Paul Butler. By expanding one's range of options and being open to novel approaches from both the left and the right, one's chances of prevailing increase. Radical method, then, can and should be multiple and pragmatic: Try everything, and see what works.

Progressive scholars should look for helpful ideas where they find them, whether from doctrinal scholars with an intriguing juxtaposition ready to run past a sympathetic judge, or from radicals even further left than they who analyze social currents without special consideration for race, which they may deem epiphenomenal and an unhelpful way of organizing one's thoughts.9 5 As mentioned, an idea is an idea, no matter who broaches it.

#### Liberalism is not monolithic – it is reflexive and premised on mutual recognition of vulnerability.

Gabriele Badano 14. PhD Candidate, Centre for Philosophy, Justice, and Health, University College London. “Political liberalism and the justice claims of the disabled: a reconciliation.” *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 17(4): 401-22. Emory Libraries.

I argue that any proposal abandoning the language of political justice would not seem to do enough for those individuals with disabilities who fall outside the basic idea of persons as depicted by Rawls. In fact, the intuitions supporting the idea that concepts like rights and opportunities are indispensable are very strong.11 Let us go back to the examples of individuals falling outside Rawls’s idea of persons because their disabilities prevent them from being a net beneﬁt to social cooperation. They are individuals who need multiple careers to work, or whose disabilities prevent them from providing a beneﬁt to social cooperation that is large enough. To put the point more sharply, it is worth noticing that the disabilities in question are compatible with being in full possession of one’s logical and moral powers. Now, should we accept that those individuals ought to be given no rights or opportunities? An afﬁrmative answer would strike us as implausible, and for a good reason. In a liberal society, having one’s rights, opportunities and basic distributive entitlements acknowledged is one and the same as being recognized as an equal. And what is missing from Rawls’s political liberalism is precisely the idea that falling below a threshold of full cooperation should not be enough to prevent the disabled from being regarded as persons on an equal footing with anyone else.

In sum, Rawls’s political liberalism is not amenable to any extension that, keeping the basic ideas of society and persons intact, is able to include a concern with the status of individuals with disabilities. In addition, the proposal that the interests of the disabled are not for public reason to protect is not satisfactory. Consequently, a substantial revision is the only way to reconcile political liberalism with our intuitions concerning what is due to the disabled.

5. Revising political liberalism I: beyond Hartley’s contractualism

The aim of this section and the next is to propose a substantial revision of Rawls’s theory that accommodates the justice claims of the disabled while upholding the project of political liberalism. A question that needs to be answered at this point is: why should we uphold the project of political liberalism, rather than endorsing a different model that more neatly ﬁts with our intuitions concerning what is due to the disabled? First, the general project of political liberalism is compelling. Rawls’s political liberalism aims to identify a common ground of political ideas that can work as the basis on which the most important political decisions should be made. This project is of the greatest importance because, if successful, it creates legitimacy by building institutions on the basis of concepts that are acceptable to each reasonable individual. Moreover, it promotes stability in societies that are characterized by deep pluralism.

Second, despite Rawls’s failure to take the interests of the disabled into consideration, political liberalism is well suited to support the justice claims of individuals with disabilities. This is because the idea that the disabled are citizens who deserve our respect is part of the common culture of our societies. In other words, there is an overlapping consensus on the idea that rights, opportunities and distributive shares must be granted to individuals who are not fully cooperating members of society, including those who fall below full moral powers. It is widely believed that those with physical disabilities should have the same rights as their fellow citizens, live in a social environment that does not excessively limit their opportunities and receive beneﬁts that help meet their special needs. Besides, although the state or third parties are given exceptional rights to interfere with the autonomy of individuals with severe cognitive disabilities, it is widely recognized that the mentally disabled are citizens whose basic interests must be protected by the law.12 In the public space, any proposal that individuals who are not fully cooperating members of society should have their basic interests neglected would be widely received with outrage. Such proposal would be said to ﬁt a fascist society, not a decent one. Among other legal documents, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN General Assembly, A/61/611) can be taken as the epitome of this widespread attitude. Adopted in 2006, the Convention requires that all individuals with disabilities should share in the enjoyment of equal fundamental rights.

#### Only liberal notions of common humanity and state policy can solve structural problems with (dis)ability. Rejection is inherently liberal, but ignores necessary reforms.

Martha Nussbaum 00. Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics, University of Chicago. “The Future of Feminist Liberalism.” *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 74(2): 47-79. Emory Libraries. Problematic language modified.

My solution to these problems lies, then, squarely within the liberal tradition. But Kittay suggests that we should go further departing from that tradition altogether. She holds that Western political theory must be radically reconfigured to put the fact of dependency at its heart. The fact, she says, that we are all "some mother's child," existing in intertwined relations of dependency, should be the guiding image for political thought.39 Such a care-based theory, she thinks, will be likely to be very different from any liberal theory, since the liberal tradition is deeply committed to goals of independence and liberty. Although Kittay supplies few details to clarify the practical meaning of the difference, I think her idea is that the care-based theory would support a type of politics that provides comprehensive support for need throughout all citizens' lives, as in some familiar ideals of the welfare state-but a welfare state in which liberty is far less important than security and well-being.

Kittay is not altogether consistent on this point. At times she herself uses classic liberal arguments, saying that we need to remember that caregivers have their own lives to lead, and to support policies that give them more choices.40 But on the whole she rejects, in the abstract, solutions that emphasize freedom as a central political goal. The concrete measures she favors do not seem to have such sweeping anti-liberal implications. The restoration and expansion of Aid to Families with Dependent Children expansion of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993; various educational measures promoting the dignity of the disabled, through a judicious combination of "mainstreaming" and separate education4"-all these are familiar liberal policies, which can be combined with an emphasis on choice and liberty as important social goals. Kittay's most controversial proposal, that of a direct non-means-tested payment to those who care for family dependents at home-clearly has, or could have, a liberal rationale: that of ensuring that these people are seen as active, dignified workers rather than passive non-contributors.

Indeed, if we adopt all the changes I have proposed, we will still have a theory that is basically liberal. For theories that take their start from an idea of human capability and functioning emphasize the importance of giving all citizens the chance to develop the full range of human powers, at whatever level their condition allows, and to enjoy the sort of liberty and independence their condition allows. Would we do better to reject this theory in favor of Kittay's idea, rejecting independence as a major social goal and conceiving of the state as a universal mother? To be sure, nobody is ever self-sufficient; the independence we enjoy is always both temporary and partial, and it is good to be reminded of that fact by a theory that also stresses the importance of care in times of dependency. But is being "some 57 mother's child" a sufficient image for the citizen in a just society? I think we need a lot more: liberty and opportunity, the chance to form a plan of life, the chance to learn and imagine on one's own. These goals are as important for [those with varying degrees of (dis)ability] the mentally handicapped as they are for others, though much more difficult to achieve. Although Kittay's daughter Sesha will never live on her own (and although Kittay is right to say that independence should not be seen as a necessary condition of dignity for all mentally disabled people)42, many others do aspire to hold a job, and vote, and tell their own story. Michael Berube ends his compelling account of his son's life with the hope that Jamie, too, will write a book about himself, as two adults with Down Syndrome recently have.43 One day Jamie's kindergarten class went round the room, asking the children what they wanted to be when they grew up. They said the usual things: basketball star, ballet dancer, fireman. The teacher wasn't sure Jamie would understand the question, so she asked it very clearly. Jamie just said, "Big." And his literal answer, said the teacher, taught them all something about the question. Berube too wants, simply, a society in which his son will be able to be "big” healthy, educated, loving, active, seen as a particular person with something distinctive to contribute, rather than as "a retarded child."

For that to happen, his dependencies must be understood and supported. But so too must his need to be distinct and an individual: and at this point Berube refers sympathetically to Rawls. He argues that the idea at the heart of the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)-the idea that every child has the right to an "appropriate education" in the "least restrictive environment" possible, based on an "Individualized Education Plan"-is a profoundly liberal idea, an idea about individuality and freedom. One of the most important kinds of support mentally disabled children need is the support required to be free choosing adults, each in his or her own way. Insofar as Kittay suggests that we downplay or marginalize such liberal notions in favor of a conception of the state that makes it the parental supporter of its "children’s needs, I thinks he goes too far, misconceiving what justice would be for both the disabled and the elderly. Even for Sesha, who will never vote or write, doesn't a full human life involve a kind of freedom and individuality namely, a space in which to exchange love and enjoy light and sound, free from confinement and mockery?

So I believe that the problem we have investigated shows us that liberal theory needs to question some of its most traditional starting points-questioning, in the process, the Kantian notion of the person. But that does not disable liberalism: it just challenges us all to produce a new form of liberalism, more attentive to need and its material and institutional conditions. The liberal ideas of freedom and of the human need for various types of liberty of action are precious ideas that feminist philosophers, it seems to me, should cherish and further develop, creating theories that make it possible for all citizens to have the support they need for the full development of their human capabilities.

#### Deploying antitrust is necessary to solve their impacts.

Zephyr Teachout 20, associate professor of law at Fordham University, 2014 political candidate for governor of New York receiving 34% of the primary vote, *Break ‘Em Up: Recovering Our Freedom from Big Ag, Big Tech, and Big Money,* 2020, e-book not paginated.

For decades, instead, the left has failed to understand the magnitude of the concentration problem, how it limits freedom in so many areas of life, how it drives inequality and empowers racism. We have focused on petitioning public government to redistribute wealth or provide social services, ignoring the creation of new, private systems of government that run our day-to-day lives. When progressives do fight private power, therefore, we often do so on the terms set by the right, in which one’s role as a consumer is more centrally important than one’s role as a citizen. Our main tool has been naming and shaming with the goal of persuading corporate boardrooms to change behavior, not persuading Congress to act. You’ve heard the phrases: Vote with your feet. Vote with your wallet. You may even have internalized them so completely that you feel guilty when you use Amazon or Uber after protesting their treatment of workers, as if it were hypocritical to demand the destruction of a service you use every day. A wellorganized strategic boycott is a powerful tool, but the degree to which the left has internalized ethical consumerism is frankly dangerous. It means that when a progressive hears about Facebook accepting lies in paid political ads, they think their job is to stop using Facebook, when they should really call their congressmember and demand that she sponsor legislation that would make social media companies liable for paid lies. Because this antipolitical ideology has infiltrated leftist politics, even progressive politicians are rarely asked to address monopoly problems; meanwhile, monopolies are lining the pockets of most Democratic and Republican candidates to make sure they look the other way.

It is a profound project, to reshape our politics and win back our freedom. But we can break these concentrations of power as soon as we set our minds to the task. We already have the tools at our disposal. Using no more than existing statutes, a new president can demand that the FTC and Department of Justice stop mergers, and implement industry-specific anti-monopoly rules across the executive branch. State attorneys general can—and are starting to— investigate big trusts, block mergers, and force divestiture. A new Congress could certainly help to speed the process, by passing laws that overturn decades of bad Supreme Court precedent and return us to the jurisprudence developed prior to 1981, when it was much easier to stop corporate concentration. That same Congress—and statehouses—can pass anti-monopoly laws directly targeting this modern threat.

With a major, grassroots anti-monopoly movement, we can radically reshape our economy and democracy in the service of human needs. We can have affordable drugs. We can have a wide-open seed market that isn’t connected to a fertilizer market. Farmers can reclaim the right to fix their own tractors, and taxi drivers can get a decent wage. We can have an economy where business owners make a profit but aren’t governed by profit maximization. We can have a basic communications infrastructure that doesn’t rely on targeted ads and surveillance. We can even have an economy made up of worker-owned co-ops and unionized corporations, small- and medium-sized businesses, and substantial local ownership, if we so choose. We can have a moral economy. But none of this will happen until we end government by private monopolies.

## 1NR

### Growth DA---1NR

#### Decline causes nationalism, scapegoating, and diversionary conflict. That turns their racism, disability, and inequality impacts.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram & Vladimir Popov 19. Former economics professor, was United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Development, and received the Wassily Leontief Prize for Advancing the Frontiers of Economic Thought in 2007. Former senior economics researcher in the Soviet Union, Russia and the United Nations Secretariat, is now Research Director at the Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute in Berlin “Economic Crisis Can Trigger World War.” <http://www.ipsnews.net/2019/02/economic-crisis-can-trigger-world-war/>.

Economic recovery efforts since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis have mainly depended on unconventional monetary policies. As fears rise of yet another international financial crisis, there are growing concerns about the increased possibility of large-scale military conflict.

More worryingly, in the current political landscape, prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising economic inequality, chauvinistic ethno-populism as well as aggressive jingoist rhetoric, including threats, could easily spin out of control and ‘morph’ into military conflict, and worse, world war.

Crisis responses limited

The 2008-2009 global financial crisis almost ‘bankrupted’ governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the world economy from the brink, but soon switched from counter-cyclical fiscal efforts to unconventional monetary measures, primarily ‘quantitative easing’ and very low, if not negative real interest rates.

But while these monetary interventions averted realization of the worst fears at the time by turning the US economy around, they did little to address underlying economic weaknesses, largely due to the ascendance of finance in recent decades at the expense of the real economy. Since then, despite promising to do so, policymakers have not seriously pursued, let alone achieved, such needed reforms.

Instead, ostensible structural reformers have taken advantage of the crisis to pursue largely irrelevant efforts to further ‘casualize’ labour markets. This lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented liquidity central banks injected into economies has not been well allocated to stimulate resurgence of the real economy.

From bust to bubble

Instead, easy credit raised asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. US house prices are now 8% more than at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, while its price-to-earnings ratio in late 2018 was even higher than in 2008 and in 1929, when the Wall Street Crash precipitated the Great Depression.

As monetary tightening checks asset price bubbles, another economic crisis — possibly more severe than the last, as the economy has become less responsive to such blunt monetary interventions — is considered likely. A decade of such unconventional monetary policies, with very low interest rates, has greatly depleted their ability to revive the economy.

The implications beyond the economy of such developments and policy responses are already being seen. Prolonged economic distress has worsened public antipathy towards the culturally alien — not only abroad, but also within. Thus, another round of economic stress is deemed likely to foment unrest, conflict, even war as it is blamed on the foreign.

International trade shrank by two-thirds within half a decade after the US passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930, at the start of the Great Depression, ostensibly to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition!

Liberalization’s discontents

Rising economic insecurity, inequalities and deprivation are expected to strengthen ethno-populist and jingoistic nationalist sentiments, and increase social tensions and turmoil, especially among the growing precariat and others who feel vulnerable or threatened.

Thus, ethno-populist inspired chauvinistic nationalism may exacerbate tensions, leading to conflicts and tensions among countries, as in the 1930s. Opportunistic leaders have been blaming such misfortunes on outsiders and may seek to reverse policies associated with the perceived causes, such as ‘globalist’ economic liberalization.

Policies which successfully check such problems may reduce social tensions, as well as the likelihood of social turmoil and conflict, including among countries. However, these may also inadvertently exacerbate problems. The recent spread of anti-globalization sentiment appears correlated to slow, if not negative per capita income growth and increased economic inequality.

To be sure, globalization and liberalization are statistically associated with growing economic inequality and rising ethno-populism. Declining real incomes and growing economic insecurity have apparently strengthened ethno-populism and nationalistic chauvinism, threatening economic liberalization itself, both within and among countries.

Insecurity, populism, conflict

Thomas Piketty has argued that a sudden increase in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Although causality is difficult to prove, with wealth and income inequality now at historical highs, this should give cause for concern.

Of course, other factors also contribute to or exacerbate civil and international tensions, with some due to policies intended for other purposes. Nevertheless, even if unintended, such developments could inadvertently catalyse future crises and conflicts.

Publics often have good reason to be restless, if not angry, but the emotional appeals of ethno-populism and jingoistic nationalism are leading to chauvinistic policy measures which only make things worse.

At the international level, despite the world’s unprecedented and still growing interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed as the US increasingly resorts to unilateral, sovereigntist policies without bothering to even build coalitions with its usual allies.

Avoiding Thucydides’ iceberg

Thus, protracted economic distress, economic conflicts or another financial crisis could lead to military confrontation by the protagonists, even if unintended. Less than a decade after the Great Depression started, the Second World War had begun as the Axis powers challenged the earlier entrenched colonial powers.

They patently ignored Thucydides’ warning, in chronicling the Peloponnesian wars over two millennia before, when the rise of Athens threatened the established dominance of Sparta!

Anticipating and addressing such possibilities may well serve to help avoid otherwise imminent disasters by undertaking pre-emptive collective action, as difficult as that may be.

#### 2. Capitalism’s not monolithic---regs solve their impacts and preserve positives.

Laura Tyson and Lenny Mendonca 21. Laura Tyson, former chair of the US President's Council of Economic Advisers, is Professor of the Graduate School at the Haas School of Business and Chair of the Blum Center Board of Trustees at the University of California, Berkeley. Lenny Mendonca, Senior Partner Emeritus at McKinsey & Company, is a former chief economic and business adviser to Governor Gavin Newsom of California and chair of the California High-Speed Rail Authority. "Capitalism We Can Believe In". Project Syndicate. 1-15-2021. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/what-to-do-about-declining-trust-in-us-capitalism-by-laura-tyson-and-lenny-mendonca-2021-01

Growing distrust of capitalism follows from its failure to address major socioeconomic challenges, not least climate change and inequalities in opportunity, income, and wealth. While private incentives under capitalism are good at stimulating efficiency, growth, and innovation, they also generate unequal income and wealth distributions (even in a context of intense competition), often at odds with social norms of fairness. Moreover, capitalist systems tend to underinvest in public goods like education, health care, and social insurance – all critical factors in the pandemic response – while also discounting negative externalities such as greenhouse-gas emissions.

These shortcomings of capitalism are predictable, but they are remediable through public policies and institutions. Tax and transfer policies and minimum wages can reduce income and wealth disparities, just as public investment in education, training, and health care can enhance opportunity by providing access to good jobs and fostering the creation of new enterprises. Likewise, a price on carbon dioxide and regulations limiting or banning carbon emissions can help the world avert the existential threat of climate change.

Critics of capitalism often miss (or choose to ignore) that there is no single canonical model. Europe’s various “social market” models differ significantly from the neoliberal variant in the US. And even within the US, there are important differences between states and localities.

Some of these distinctions have been highlighted in the responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and recession. All advanced economies have deployed unprecedented levels of fiscal and monetary stimulus in the face of “K-shaped” or “dual” recessions in which lower-wage workers have suffered disproportionately more than other cohorts. Unlike the US, Germany and several other European countries have deployed measures specifically designed to keep as many workers as possible in their jobs. Because these countries have generous social insurance and benefits, including sick leave and family leave, workers and their families have been able to cope with both COVID-19 and sudden drops in their incomes.

Differences in national health-care models have also become more apparent. Unlike European capitalist systems that provide universal coverage, 14.5% of America’s non-elderly population (ages 18-64) remains uninsured. Moreover, owing to America’s heavy reliance on employer-based insurance, the pandemic has pushed at least 15 million more workers at least temporarily into the uninsured pool.

With their strong public-health systems, many European countries were also better equipped to carry out widespread testing and vaccine distribution. The US, meanwhile, has utterly failed to contain the virus, and is now delegating the vaccination campaign to under-resourced state and local authorities.

In another contrast with the US, Europe has dedicated about one-third of its massive stimulus program to investments aligned with its commitment to achieve carbon neutrality by mid-century. America’s federal stimulus measures have been silent on climate with few conditions of any kind.

Within the US, individual states’ responses to the COVID-19 crisis reflect different variants of capitalism. In California, Governor Gavin Newsom’s recent 2021-22 budget proposal reveals some distinctive features. In terms of health-care coverage, California remains a national leader with a Medicaid program covering more than 13 million people. Despite the pandemic-induced recession, the state is increasing its minimum wage to $14 per hour in 2021, on track to realize the target of $15 per hour in 2022 for all businesses employing 26 or more workers; many municipalities, including Los Angeles and San Francisco, have already achieved or exceeded the $15 target. (On January 1, 2021, 20 other states also raised their minimum wages, whereas the US federal minimum wage has remained unchanged at $7.25 per hour since 2009.)

California has also expanded coverage of its Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and Young Child Tax Credit to include undocumented workers who are otherwise denied the benefits of federal stimulus packages. Together, these tax credits applied to 3.6 million California households in 2020, adding $1 billion in total income. The state also passed new legislation significantly expanding unpaid family-leave rights. Employers with as few as five employees now must provide this option as well as more time for paid sick leave for workers forced to self-isolate or quarantine as a result of COVID-19 exposure or diagnosis.

Looking ahead, Newsom has proposed an additional $600 one-time cash payment to all taxpayers who are eligible for the state’s EITC in 2021. His proposed 2021-22 budget also earmarks $372 million to expedite the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, and includes $4.5 billion for programs to drive economic growth and job creation once restrictions on normal activities have been lifted. These programs include $575 million in grants to small businesses and nonprofits, in addition to the $500 million for such grants implemented in late 2020 amid forced business closures. The proposal also allocates up to an additional $50 million for the California Rebuilding Fund, a public-private partnership, to support up to an additional $125 million of low-interest loans to underserved small businesses throughout the state.

California’s distinctive approach to market capitalism also emphasizes climate sustainability, using both carbon pricing and efficiency standards to achieve ambitious decarbonization targets. Under a 2018 state law, 60% of electricity must come from renewable resources by 2030, and 100% by 2045. California runs the world’s fourth-largest cap-and-trade system and will be setting even lower caps (and thus a higher carbon price) next month. In September 2020, Newsom announced an executive order requiring that zero-emission vehicles account for 100% of new car sales by 2035. His proposed budget seeks $1.5 billion to accelerate the infrastructure investment needed to achieve this goal.

President-elect Joe Biden has just announced a $1.9 trillion emergency rescue plan to counter the pandemic’s surge and provide substantial relief to workers, families, small businesses, and state and local governments. Prompt congressional passage of this plan is a critical first step in the renovation of America’s outdated neoliberal version of capitalism. As the economy recovers from the deep and uneven COVID-19 recession, the US must “build back better” by strengthening its social safety net, increasing public investment in education, health care, and other public goods, and rejoining the global charge against climate change. Lessons from the more successful variants of market capitalism in Europe and California point the way forward.

#### 3. Growth is sustainable, degrowth fails, and the aff collapses global living standards.

Noah Smith 9/6/21. Assistant Professor of finance @ SUNY Stony Brook, an economics PhD student at the University of Michigan, an academic editor in Japan, and a physics major at Stanford. “People are realizing that degrowth is bad.” https://noahpinion.substack.com/p/people-are-realizing-that-degrowth

I was going to write a lengthy post explaining why “degrowth” — the idea that we need to halt economic growth in order to save the planet — is a very bad idea. But in the meantime, other people have written that post, or recorded that podcast, and done it well. These include Branko Milanovic, Kelsey Piper, and Ezra Klein. So instead I’ll write a shorter post trying to catalog and boil down the arguments against degrowth.

But first, let’s go over the standard argument, so we can see why these new arguments are necessary.

The standard argument against degrowth

First, note that the typical argument against degrowth, which I laid out in a Bloomberg post a while back, is that we don’t need it; we can raise human living standards without exhausting the planet. This argument was capably put forward by Andy McAfee, in his excellent book More From Less, which you should buy and read. Essentially, the idea that economic growth requires growth in resource use is false; rich countries have started to grow while using less and less of the planet’s most important resources. For example, here is U.S. use of fresh water and various metals, as well as trade-adjusted carbon emissions:

[Chart, bar chart

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So the idea here is that we don’t need degrowth; instead, we can keep raising everyone’s standard of living without exhausting the planet’s resources. Because growth doesn’t just mean using more and more stuff; instead, it can mean finding more efficient ways to use the stuff we have.

Degrowthers have two counters to this. Their first counter, typically, is to show a graph of resource use for the entire world, and show that it’s correlated with global growth. This is a weak response, for two reasons:

1. Degrowthers have no idea how to combine various resources into an overall measure of resource use, so they typically go with gross weight. This is absurd, since some materials are recyclable and others are not — if you “use” a ton of copper you still have the copper, whereas if you “use” a ton of oil, your oil is gone. It’s also absurd because it doesn’t take into account the relative abundance of resources — if you figure out how to substitute 2 tons of sand for 1 ton of oil, you’re getting more efficient, since sand is much more plentiful than oil (and doesn’t pollute as much when you use it). A lot of growth is figuring out how to substitute plentiful resources for rare ones, and simply adding up gross tonnage ignores this.
2. Past trends are no guarantee of future trends. Until the 70s, for instance, U.S. economic growth was closely correlated with both energy use and carbon emissions; after the 70s, this correlation broke down completely and the lines started moving in opposite directions. Degrowthers present historical curves as if these are laws of nature, but we know that they are not. The trend is your friend only til the bend at the end. And the fact that rich countries have hit an inflection point where economic growth no longer depends on growing resource use is a strong indicator that industrializing countries like China will also hit this point as well. (And no, falling use in rich countries is mostly not due to outsourcing, as the emissions graph above illustrates.)

So this degrowther argument is just wrong. But degrowthers have a second, far better counter to McAfee’s notion that we can have our cake and eat it too: Decoupling isn’t happening fast enough. If we wait for China and India and all the countries of Africa to industrialize in a resource-intensive way like today’s developed countries did, and then to dematerialize their growth like today’s developed countries are doing now, it will be far too late and the planet will suffer ecological catastrophe.

This argument isn’t as strong as it sounds — China and India and the rest will be able to take advantage of the efficiency-inducing technologies created by the developed countries, like solar power (indeed, they are already doing so). And they will be able to embrace “dematerialized” goods and services like social networks and video games (sorry, Xi Jinping) very early in their growth path. So these countries’ resource use trajectories won’t look quite like the U.S.’ or Europe’s.

But this degrowther argument does contain a nugget of truth: Global resource use is currently on an unsustainable trajectory. Here, via Zeke Hausfather, are the current projections for global warming by century’s end, even with the advances in techologies like solar:

[CHART OMITTED]

Any one of these scenarios represents utter global catastrophe.

So even if there is a sustainable growth path, we are not currently on it. About this, degrowthers are right; a gentle, natural transition to green growth is possible, but is an unaffordable luxury. But degrowthers’ prescription is the wrong one.

The reason, in a word, is politics. The kind of massive intention reordering of global production and consumption that degrowthers fantasize about is not just pragmatically impossible to implement, it’s the kind of thing that essentially everyone in the world except for a few very shouty people in Northern Europe and the occasional Twitter activist is going to reject. To see why, let us turn to the excellent articles/podcasts by Milanovic, Piper, and Klein.

The political argument against degrowth

Milanovic actually has two excellent posts on the topic of degrowth. In the first one, he lays out why forcing developing countries to stay in poverty would be bad:

Let us suppose, for the sake of the argument, that we interpret “degrowth” as the decision to fix global GDP at its current level…Then, unless we change the distribution of income, we are condemning to permanent abject poverty some 15 percent of world population that currently earn less than $1.90 per day and some quarter of humankind who earn less than $2.50 per day…Keeping so many people in abject poverty so that the rich can continue to enjoy their current standard of living is obviously something that the proponents of degrowth would not condone.

Enforcing global degrowth would require freezing world income at about $17,000/year. That means that most people in the world would never even come close to current rich-world living standards — instead, they would at best only be able to reach the level currently enjoyed in China or Botswana. Perhaps that’s not such a horrible fate, but as Milanovic notes, this would require impoverishing most of the population of developed countries. He elaborates on this point in his new post, pulling no punches:

[In order to avoid keeping most of the world in poverty, degrowthers must] introduce a different [income] distribution (B) where everybody who is above the current mean world income ($PPP 16 per day) is driven down to this mean, and the poor countries and people are, at least for a while, allowed to continue growing until they too achieve the level of $PPP 16 per day. But the problem with that approach is that one would have to engage in a massive reduction of incomes for…practically all of the Western population. Only 14% of the population in Western countries live at the level of income less than the global mean…Degrowers thus need to convince 86% of the population living in rich countries that their incomes are too high and need to be reduced….It is quite obvious that such a proposition is a political suicide.

Milanovic quite rightly waves away degrowthers’ protestations that GDP is not a good measure of human welfare. GDP isn’t perfect, he notes, but it’s close enough where the basic point stands.

Demanding that people in rich countries accept absolutely catastrophic declines in their living standards is a political non-starter. Klein, on his podcast, tries to point this out as gently as possible:

I think that if the political demand of the [degrowth] movement becomes you don’t get to eat beef, you will set climate politics back so far, so fast, it would be disastrous. Same thing with S.U.V.s. I don’t like S.U.V.s. I don’t drive one. But if you are telling people in rich countries that the climate movement is for them not having the cars they want to have, you are just going to lose. You are going to lose fast…This is where the politics of [degrowth] for me fall apart…

I just don’t see the argument for degrowth as being anything but an extraordinarily slower way of approaching the politics, probably counterproductive compared to what we’re doing, which is I think you can make tremendous strides on climate change by deploying renewable energy technologies and giving people the opportunity to have a more materially fulfilling life atop those technologies.

Milanovic is less gentle, calling this “outright magical thinking”. He is correct. When you look at how much people in America are willing to sacrifice in terms of their material well-being in order to fight climate change, it’s far less than what Klein is talking about. And Klein is really softballing it here — it’s not just giving up beef and SUVs, it’s a dramatic reduction in the size of housing and the amount of food and the ease of transportation and the quality of medical care that people in rich countries enjoy. It is, frankly, not happening.

But even this vastly understates the political and practical difficulties of degrowth. Piper adds several key points. First of all, she notes, because developed countries have been decoupling resource use and growth for a while now, curbing resource use will actually cause a lot more restrictions on developing countries than Milanovic’s simple calculations would suggest:

From a climate change perspective, though, there’s a problem [with simply reducing rich-world living standards]. First, it means that degrowth would do nothing about the bulk of emissions, which are occurring in developing countries.

This is an incredibly important point. For example, China now produces more CO2 emissions than the U.S., the EU, and Japan combined:

[Chart, line chart

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(And no, this is not because of outsourcing, as you can see by looking at the trade-adjusted emissions numbers.)

Another way of looking at this is that China’s CO2 emissions per dollar of GDP are more than twice America’s, and about five times that of the EU. Any global degrowth plan that actually reduces resource use is going to entail more pain for China than its GDP numbers would suggest, simply because China is at a more resource-intensive stage of growth.

Do you think China will accept a substantial diminution of its living standards, in order to satisfy the environmental-economic diktats of activists in Northern Europe? If so, you need to rethink a great many things.

Anyway, Piper makes a second crucially important point. So far we’ve been waving our hands and talking about lowering rich-world GDP while raising GDP for poor countries. In fact, economies don’t work like that:

Second, the global economy is more interconnected than Hickel implies. When Covid-19 hit, poor countries were devastated not just by the virus but by the aftershocks of virus-induced slowdowns in consumption in rich countries.

There’s some genuine appeal to the idea of an end to “consumerism,” but the pandemic offered a taste of how a sudden drop in rich-world consumption would actually affect the developing world. Covid-19 dramatically curtailed Western imports and tourism for a time. The consequences in poor countries were devastating. Hunger rose, and child mortality followed.

Degrowth would thus require deep changes in the entire way that the global economy works. Change happens, but not like that; implementing the kind of reallocation schemes that degrowthers throw around with abandon would require global economic planning that would put Gosplan to shame. Klein points this out, again rather gently:

Degrowth is, as its advocates understand it, a act of global economic planning really without equal anywhere in human history. It is an act of extraordinary central planning.

In other words, it is abject fantasy.

Taken together, these criticisms are utterly devastating to the entire degrowth project. In its current form, it will not advance beyond a media fad. No matter how shrilly degrowthers quote apocalyptic projections, the things they call for simply will not happen.

#### 4. Only capitalism can counteract climate change.

Shi-Ling Hsu 21, D'Alemberte Professor of Law at the Florida State University College of Law, “2 How Capitalism Saves the Environment,” Capitalism and the Environment, Cambridge University Press, 10/31/2021, pp. 28–55

2.8 CHOOSING CAPITALISM TO SAVE THE ENVIRONMENT: LARGE-SCALE DEPLOYMENT

Finally, a third reason that capitalism is suited to the job of environmental restoration and protection is its ability to undertake and complete projects at very large scales. In keeping with a major thesis of this book, construction at very large scales should give us a little pause, because of the propensity of capital to metastasize into a source of political resistance to change. But some global problems, especially climate change, may require very large-scale enterprises.

For example, because greenhouse gas emissions may already have passed a threshold for catastrophic climate change, technology is almost certainly needed to chemically capture carbon dioxide from ambient air. But carbon dioxide is only about 0.15% of ambient air by molecular weight, and a tremendous amount of ambient air must be processed just to capture a small amount of carbon dioxide. This technology has often been referred to as "direct air capture," or "carbon removal." Given that inherent limitation, direct air capture technology must be deployed at vast scales in order to make any appreciable difference in greenhouse gas concentrations. There is certainly no guarantee that direct air capture will be a silver bullet. But if it is to be an effectual item on a menu of survival techniques, it will more assuredly be accomplished under the incentives of a capitalist economy.

Capitalism might also help with the looming crisis of climate change by helping to ensure the supply of vital life staples such as food, water, and other basic needs in future shortages caused by climate-change. In a climate-changed future, there is the distinct possibility that supplies of vital life staples may run short, possibly for long periods of time. Droughts are projected to last longer, with water supplies and growing conditions increasingly precarious. Capitalist enterprise could, first of all, provide the impetus to finally reform a dizzying multitude of price distortions that plague water supply and agriculture worldwide. Second, capitalist enterprise can undertake scale production of some emergent technologies that might alleviate shortages. Desalination technology can convert salty seawater into drinkable freshwater.54 A number of environmental and economic issues need to be solved to deploy these technologies at large scales, but in a crisis, solutions will be more likely to present themselves.

A technology that is already being adopted to produce food is the modernized version of old-fashioned greenhouses. The tiny country of the Netherlands, with its 17 million people crowded onto 13,000 square miles, is the second largest food exporter in the world,55 exporting fully three-quarters that of the United States in 2017.56 The secret to Dutch agriculture is its climate-controlled, low-energy green-houses that project solar panel-powered artificial sunlight around the clock. Dutch greenhouses produce lettuce at ten times the yield57 and tomatoes at fifteen times the yield outdoors in the United States58 while using less than one-thirteenth the amount of water,59 very little in the way of synthetic pesticides and, of course, very little fertilizer given its advanced composting techniques. Sustained shortages in a climate-changed future might require that a capitalist take hold of greenhouse growing and expand production to feed the masses that might otherwise revolt.

2.9 CHOOSE CAPITALISM

Clearly, the job in front of humankind is enormous, complex, and many-faceted. The best hope is to be able to identify certain human impacts that are clearly harmful to the global environment, and to disincentivize them. Getting back to notions of institutions in capitalism, what is crucial is aligning the right incentives with profit-making activity. What capitalism does so well — beyond human comprehension — is coordinate activity and send broad signals about scarcity. Information about a wide variety of environmental phenomena is extremely difficult to collect and process. If a set of environmental taxes can help establish a network of environ-mental prices, then an unfathomably large and complex machinery will have been set in motion in the right direction.

Also, because of the need for new scientific solutions to this daunting list of problems, new science and technology is desperately needed. Capitalism is tried and true in terms of producing innovation. Again drawing upon the study of institutions, it is not so much that individuals need a profit-motive in order to tinker, but the prospect of profit-making has to be present in order for institutions, including corporations, to devote resources, attention, and energy towards the development of solutions to environmental problems. Corporations can and should demonstrate social responsibility by attempting to mitigate their impacts on the global environment, but a much more conscious push for new knowledge, new techniques, and new solutions are needed.

Finally, the scale of needed change is profound. Huge networks of infrastructure centered upon a fossil fuel-centered economy must somehow be replaced or adapted to new ways of generating, transmitting, consuming, and storing energy. A global system of feeding seven billion humans (and counting), unsustainable on its face, must be morphed into something else that can fill that huge role. About a billion and a half cars and trucks in the world must, over time, be swapped out for vehicles that must be dramatically different.

This is a daunting to-do list, but look a bit more carefully among the gloomy news. Elon Musk, a freewheeling, pot-smoking entrepreneur shows signs of breaking into not one, but two industries dominated by behemoths with political power. Thanks to California emissions standards, automobile manufacturers have developed cars that emit a fraction of what they did less than a generation ago. Hybrid electric vehicles have thoroughly penetrated an American market that powerful American politicians had tried to cordon off for American manufacturers only. At least two companies have developed meat substitutes that are now widely judged to be indistinguishable from meat, and have established product outposts in the ancient power centers of fast food, McDonald's and Burger King. The tiny country of the Netherlands, about half the size of West Virginia, exports almost as much food as the United States, able to ship fresh produce all the way to Africa. At bottom, all of these accomplishments and thousands more are and were capitalist in nature. While they collectively repre-sent a trifle of what still needs to be accomplished, they were also undertaken without the correct incentives in place, and thus also represent the tremendous promise of capitalism.

#### 5. Past the tipping point---only tech can solve.

Eric Levitz 5/17/21. Senior Writer at New York Magazine. MA Johns Hopkins. "We’ll Innovate Our Way Out of the Climate Crisis or Die Trying". Intelligencer. 5-17-2021. https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/05/climate-biden-green-tech-innovation.html

Today’s best-case ecological scenario was a horror story just three decades ago. In 1993, Bill Clinton declared that global warming presented such a profound threat to civilization that the U.S. would have to bring its “emissions of greenhouse gases to their 1990 levels by the year 2000.” Instead, we waited until 2020 to do so; in the interim, humanity burned more carbon than it had since the advent of agriculture. Now, it will take a historically unprecedented, worldwide economic transformation to freeze warming at “only” 2 degrees — a level of temperature rise that will turn “once in a century” storms into annual events, drown entire island nations, and render major cities in the Middle East uninhabitable in summertime (at least for those whose lifestyles involve “walking outdoors without dying of heatstroke”). This is what passes for a utopian vision in 2021. If we confine ourselves to mere optimism — and assume that every Paris Agreement signatory meets its current pledged target for decarbonization — then warming will hit 2.4 degrees by century’s end.

The reality of our ecological predicament invites denial of our political one. Put simply, it is hard to reconcile the scale of the climate crisis with the limits of contemporary American politics. Delusions rush in to fill the gap. Among these is the fantasy of national autonomy; the notion that the United States can save the planet or destroy it, depending on the precise timeline of its domestic decarbonization. A rapid energy transition in the U.S. is a vital cause, not least for its potential to expedite similar transformations abroad. But the battle for a sustainable planet will be won or lost in the developing world. Although American consumption played a central role in the history of the climate crisis, it is peripheral to the planet’s future: Over the coming century, U.S. emissions are expected to account for only 5 percent of the global total.

There is also the delusion of “de-growth’s” viability. The fact that there is no plausible path for global economic expansion that won’t entail climate-induced death and displacement has led some environmentalists to insist on global stagnation. Yet there is neither a mass constituency for this project, nor any reason to believe that there will be any time soon. Freeze the status-quo economy in amber, and you’ll condemn nearly half of humanity to permanent poverty. Divide existing GDP into perfectly even slices, and every person on the planet will live on about $5,500 a year. American voters may express a generalized concern about the climate in surveys, but they don’t seem willing to accept even a modest rise in gas prices — let alone a total collapse in living standards — to address the issue. Meanwhile, any Chinese or Indian leader who attempted to stymy income growth in the name of sustainability would be ousted in short order. It’s conceivable that one could radically reorder advanced economies in a manner that enabled living standards to rise even as GDP fell; Americans might well find themselves happier and more secure in an ultra-low-carbon communal economy in which individual car ownership is heavily restricted, and housing, healthcare, and myriad low-carbon leisure activities are social rights. But nothing short of an absolute dictatorship could affect such a transformation at the necessary speed. And the specter of eco-Bolshevism does not haunt the Global North. Humanity is going to find a way to get rich sustainably, or die trying.

Thus, the chasm between the ecologically necessary and the politically possible can only be bridged by technological advance. And on that front, the U.S. actually has the resources to make a decisive contribution to global decarbonization — and some political will to leverage those resources. Unfortunately, due to some combination of fiscal superstitions and misplaced priorities, the Biden administration’s proposed investments in green innovation remain paltry. An American Jobs Plan with much higher funding for green R&D is both imminently winnable and environmentally imperative. U.S. climate hawks should make securing such legislation a top priority.

The choice before us is techno-optimism or barbarism.

If governments are forced to choose between increasing income growth in the present, and mitigating temperature rise in the future, they are going to pick the former. We’ll get cheap, lab-grown Kobe beef before we get a U.S. Senate willing to tax meat, and steel plants powered by “green hydrogen” before we get anarcho-primitivism with Chinese characteristics.

The question is whether we’ll get such breakthroughs before it’s too late.

Techno-optimism has its hazards, but the progress we’ve made toward decarbonization has come largely through technological innovation. When India canceled plans to construct 14 gigawatts of new coal-fired power stations in 2019, it did not do so in deference to international pressure or domestic environmental movements, but rather to the cost-competitiveness of solar energy. The same story holds across Asia’s developing countries: Thanks to a ninefold reduction in the cost of solar energy over the past decade, the number of new coal plants slated for construction in the region has fallen by 80 percent. Meanwhile, the road to an electric-car revolution was cleared by a collapse in the cost of lithium batteries, the challenge of powering cities with solar energy on cloudy days was eased by a 70 percent drop in the price of utility-scale batteries, and wind power grew 40 percent cheaper. Our species remains lackluster at solidarity and self-government, but we’ve got a real knack for building cool shit.

The technological progress of the past decade was not sufficient to compensate for tepid climate policy. But real techno-utopianism has never been tried: As of 2019, global spending on clean energy R&D totaled $22 billion a year, or 3 percent of the Pentagon’s annual budget. Increasing spending on such research — while expediting cost-reductions in existing technologies by deploying them en masse — should be twin priorities of American climate policy.

The preconditions for green industrialization can be made in America.

The United States has more fiscal capacity and better-financed research universities than any nation on the planet. And, for all the pathologies of our politics, public investment in green tech inspires far weaker opposition than many less-indispensable climate policies. In fact, late last year, with Republicans controlling the Senate and Donald Trump in the White House, the U.S. increased funding for zero-emission technology R&D by $35 billion. America does not have sovereignty over enough humans to save the planet by slashing our domestic emissions. But we just might have the resources and political economy necessary to help the developing world save us all.

Although progress on renewables has exceeded optimistic expectations, the technical obstacles to global decarbonization remain immense. In the most optimistic scenario, scaling up existing, cost-competitive technologies can get us about 16 percent of the emissions reductions necessary for achieving net-zero by 2050, according to the International Energy Agency. Driving down the price of tech we already have will get us another 39 percent. The rest must come from technologies that have yet to be fully developed. We need electrified cement, hydrogen-powered steel plants, and evaporative cooling. We need utility-scale energy storage, electric airplanes, and ultra-high voltage transmission lines. And we’d be remiss to not toss a bit of our collective wealth at game-changing hail marys like nuclear fusion.

#### They can’t solve their unsustainability warrants:

#### 1. Aff fails---Socialist state-owned oil proves.

Shi-Ling Hsu 21. D'Alemberte Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Environmental Programs at the Florida State University College of Law. Capitalism and the Environment: A Proposal to Save the Planet. “1 Introduction”

Energy companies are a case in point. The advent of hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, has been a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it has and will continue to push out the use of coal as an electricity generation fuel and dramatically reduce carbon dioxide emissions and other pollutants. On the other hand, fracking has produced a variety of other environmental costs, and given the increasingly dire findings about climate change, natural gas cannot stay long at the apex of the energy pyramid. But it has been transformative in a way that is hard to envision in a socialist economy. For those that imagine that the social and environmental costs of energy production would be better managed under something other than capitalism, the track records of Saudi Aramco, the Chinese oil giants, and many state-owned energy companies are not very reassuring.

Winston Churchill said that “Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others that have been tried from time to time.”22 He has been misquoted at times as having said that capitalism is the worst economic system, except for all the others. That seems accurate as well. There is something fundamental about capitalism, in all its forms, that creates a tendency to produce both wealth and transformation. The environmental crises that are now upon humankind require large changes in a relatively short time, and nothing appears quite capable of that other than capitalism.

#### 2. Aff causes rent seeking and picking winners.

Shi-Ling Hsu 21. D'Alemberte Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Environmental Programs at the Florida State University College of Law. Capitalism and the Environment: A Proposal to Save the Planet. “1 Introduction”

On the flipside, Congress, federal agencies, or any governmental bodies have rarely sported an enviable record of affirmatively doing good deeds. In some instances, the effort may be worthwhile, as it is in the provision of public housing, even as it has been beset with failures. But in the environmental field, the government record on public projects has been spotty, at best. Environmental transgressions are too numerous to even begin to list, but just a few examples might suffice to reinforce the point. Dam building, levee-constructions, and power plants leap to mind. And yet, governments are constantly being asked to subsidize or otherwise support what seem like “good” projects with “good” outcomes. What are we to make of those proposals?

There is a saying, the attribution of which is difficult to trace, that goes something like “governments are bad at picking winners, and losers are good at picking governments.”24 Government can and must provide public goods, such as defense, education, roads, police and fire protection, parks, other things that would be undersupplied if left to private initiatives only. But too often private industrialists, unable to make a profit in a competitive market, come seeking the government’s help, and too often, they are granted help. This is a time-tested theory of government’s vulnerability to “rent-seeking,” and a very large body of literature25 has been validated by countless dubious government initiatives to support one industry or another.

#### 2. Regulated capitalism solves.

Mark Budolfson 21. PhD in Philosophy. Assistant Professor in the Department of Environmental and Occupational Health and Justice at the Rutgers School of Public Health and Center for Population–Level Bioethics "Arguments for Well-Regulated Capitalism, and Implications for Global Ethics, Food, Environment, Climate Change, and Beyond". Cambridge Core. 5-7-2021. https://www-cambridge-org.proxy.library.emory.edu/core/journals/ethics-and-international-affairs/article/arguments-for-wellregulated-capitalism-and-implications-for-global-ethics-food-environment-climate-change-and-beyond/96F422D04E171EECDEF77312266AE9DD

Using the Argument for Well-Regulated Capitalism to Diagnose the Problems with Neoliberalism

The literature on political theory, ethics, and society generally, and on food ethics specifically, often includes critiques of neoliberalism as the alleged root of many problems, often as a synonym for the root of problems with capitalism.31 However, the argument previously made for well-regulated capitalism can help focus our attention on what the important problems are with neoliberalism (as well as with crony capitalism and other suboptimal forms of capitalism), and thus on what reforms and progress are genuinely needed. Recall that premise 2 defines well-regulated capitalism in terms of the conditions that are necessary (as well as sufficient, given assumptions like perfect information and complete markets),32 according to mainstream public and welfare economics, to generate ethically optimal outcomes; summarizing premise 2, these conditions are the following:

1. Regulation of externalities and public goods: optimal regulation of positive and negative externalities, including investments in public goods;

2. Distributive justice: redistribution to achieve equity and distributive justice;

3. Rule of law: rule of law, clearly defined property rights, basic rights as side constraints, and equitable redistribution for historical rights violations;

4. Free exchange: free exchange subject to the constraints of conditions 1, 2, and 3.

With this definition in hand, we can make a number of observations relevant to evaluating neoliberalism.

First, well-regulated capitalism need not ignore equity and justice. It is consistent with disagreement about what redistribution should happen for purposes of equity; some proponents favor large-scale redistribution, while others endorse a conception of equity that favors only minimal redistribution. What all proponents agree on is that whatever form of redistribution we need, it should happen within the structural framework of well-regulated capitalism. Similarly, proponents might disagree about the empirical reasons for how big the externality is associated with GHG emissions, but they agree on the basic framework of how they should be addressed within the theory of externalities and within this structure of well-regulated capitalism, more generally. Neither a concern for equity nor a concern for externalities such as environmental pollution provides a reason to reject capitalism per se, as we saw above.

Indeed, well-regulated capitalism is consistent with radical redistribution. If, for example, large reparations are required due to the historical injustices of colonialism, slavery, and resulting inequities, then well-regulated capitalism implies that large redistributions and corrections should happen as a matter of distributive justice (condition 2) and rule of law (condition 3). The argument for well-regulated capitalism does not itself take a stand on such specific issues, but rather argues that insofar as a correction of inequity and injustice is required, it should happen within this structural framework of well-regulated capitalism.

Second, the word “neoliberalism” is often used to refer to a particular undesirable form of capitalism that falls far short of well-regulated capitalism. Note that in ordinary language, economic systems that depart from the ideal of well-regulated capitalism are still regarded as forms of capitalism, insofar as they involve free exchange, the rule of law, and clearly defined property rights (in other words, the nonnormative parts of free exchange (condition 4) and the procedural justice components of the rule of law (condition 3)).33 Neoliberalism is often used to refer to forms of capitalism that incorporate only these limited features and none of the others. This brings into clear focus why such a form of capitalism is undesirable—because ignoring pollution, inequity, injustice, and failing to provide public goods in such a way leads to much worse outcomes for society than are possible, and outcomes that are highly unjust. However, proponents of capitalism would insist that the best solution is to adopt a better form of capitalism closer to the ideal that includes concerns for the regulation of externalities and public goods (condition 1), distributive justice (condition 2), and all aspects of the rule of law (condition 3).

#### Data proves our argument.

Rainer Zitelmann 10/12/21. Doctorates in history and sociology. "Capitalism is good, not bad, for the environment". Washington Examiner. 10-12-2021. https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/capitalism-is-good-not-bad-for-the-environment

Every year, the Heritage Foundation ranks countries around the world on their economic freedom. It's a kind of capitalism index .

But analysis shows that the most economically "free" countries also register the highest scores on Yale University’s EPI environmental index , averaging 76.1, while "mostly free" countries averaged 70.2. These two groups have a significant lead over the "moderately free" countries, which received much lower ratings (59.6 points) for their environmental performance.

The countries rated by the Heritage Foundation as either "mostly unfree" or "repressed" received by far the worst Environmental Performance Index scores (46.7 and 50.3, respectively). Researchers at Yale University found that there is not only a correlation between the Heritage Foundation’s index and their own EPI but also between the EPI and the "Ease of Doing Business Index." That latter index is published each year as part of the World Bank’s "Doing Business Report" and is generally regarded as the world’s most comprehensive and reliable gauge of the ease of doing business.

In 2016, researchers published a study in the journal Sustainability that included an evaluation of the correlation between the EPI and the "Open Market Index" compiled by the International Chamber of Commerce. The OMI measures a country’s openness to free trade and is thus an important indicator of economic freedom. The researchers found a high degree of overlap between the OMI index and the EPI:19 of the OMI’s 27 highest-scoring countries also appear in the top 27 of the EPI. The survey covered a total of 75 countries, including all G20 and European Union members. Together, these countries account for more than 90% of international trade and investment. The researchers found evidence for their "hypothesis that countries with an open economy score higher in environmental performance."

There are two real-world observations that also disprove the argument that stronger economic growth automatically leads to greater environmental pollution. First, in noncapitalist countries, environmental degradation has been a far more serious problem than in capitalist countries. Second, the correlation between economic growth and increasing resource consumption is becoming ever weaker in the age of dematerialization.

Put simply, these studies point in the same direction: Capitalism is not the problem. It is the solution — both economically and environmentally.

#### Causes mass death---only capitalism enables a peaceful solution to poverty.

Rainer Zitelmann 21. German historian and author of “The Rich in Public Opinion.” "Violence Is History’s Great Economic Leveler." National Interest. 6-30-2021. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/violence-history%E2%80%99s-great-economic-leveler-188974

Another question that is all too rarely asked is: What would be the price of eliminating inequality? In 2017, the renowned Stanford historian and scholar of ancient history Walter Scheidel presented an impressive historical analysis of this question: The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century. He concludes that societies that have been spared mass violence and catastrophes have never experienced substantial reductions in inequality.

Substantial reductions in inequality have only ever been achieved as the result of violent shocks, primarily consisting of war, revolution, state failure and systems collapse, and plague.

According to Scheidel, the greatest levelers of the twentieth century did not include peaceful social reforms, they were the two world wars and the communist revolutions. More than 100 million people died in each of the two world wars and in the communist social experiments.

Total War as a Great Leveler

World War II serves as Scheidel’s strongest example of “total war” leveling. Take Japan: In 1938, the wealthiest 1 percent of the population received 19.9 percent of all reported income before taxes and transfers. Within the next seven years, their share dropped by two-thirds, all the way down to 6.4 percent. More than half of this loss was incurred by the richest tenth of that top bracket: their income share collapsed from 9.2 percent to 1.9 percent in the same period, a decline by almost four-fifths. The declared real value of the income of the largest 1 percent of estates in Japan’s population fell by 90 percent between 1936 and 1945 and by almost 97 percent between 1936 to 1949. The top 0.1 percent of all estates lost even more during this period, 93 and 98 percent, respectively. During this period, the Japanese economic system was transformed as state intervention gradually created a planned economy that preserved only a facade of free-market capitalism. Executive bonuses were capped, rental income was fixed by the authorities, and between 1935 and 1943 the top income tax rate in Japan doubled.

Significant leveling also took place in other countries during wartime. According to Scheidel’s analysis, the two world wars were among the greatest levelers in history. The average percentage drop of top income shares in countries that actively fought in World War II as frontline states was 31 percent of the prewar level. This is a robust finding because the sample consists of a dozen countries. The only two countries in which inequality increased during this period were also those farthest from the major theaters of war (Argentina and South Africa).

Low savings rates and depressed asset prices, physical destruction and the loss of foreign assets, inflation and progressive taxation, rent and price controls, and nationalization all contributed in varying degrees to equalization. The wealth of the rich was dramatically reduced in the two world wars, whether countries lost or won, suffered occupation during or after the war, were democracies or run by autocratic regimes.

The economic consequences of the two world wars were, therefore, devastating for the rich—a fact that stands in direct opposition to the thesis that it was capitalists that instigated the wars in pursuit of their own economic interests. Contrary to the popular perception that the lower classes suffered most in the wars, in economic terms it was the capitalists who were the biggest losers.

Incidentally, the left-wing economist Thomas Piketty comes to a similar conclusion. In his book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, he argues that progressive taxation in the twentieth century was primarily a product of the two world wars and not of democracy.

Poverty is Eliminated Peacefully

The price of reducing inequality has thus usually involved violent shocks and catastrophes, whose victims have been not only the rich but millions and millions of people. Neither nonviolent land reforms nor economic crises nor democratization has had as great a leveling effect throughout recorded history as these violent upheavals. If the goal is to distribute income and wealth more equally, says historian Scheidel, then we simply cannot close our eyes to the violent ruptures that have so often proved necessary to achieve that goal. We must ask ourselves whether humanity has ever succeeded in equalizing the distribution of wealth without considerable violence. Analyzing thousands of years of human history, Scheidel’s answer is no. This may be a depressing finding for many adherents of egalitarian ideas.

However, if we shift perspective, and ask not “How do we reduce inequality?” but “How do we reduce poverty?” then we can provide an optimistic answer: Not violent ruptures of the kind that led to reductions of inequality, but very peaceful mechanisms, namely innovations and growth, brought about by the forces of capitalism, have led to the greatest declines in poverty. Or, to put it another way: The greatest “levelers” in history have been violent events such as wars, revolutions, state and systems collapses, and pandemics, but the greatest poverty reducer in history has been capitalism. Before capitalism came into being, most of the world’s population was living in extreme poverty—in 1820, the rate stood at 90 percent. Today, it’s down to less than 10 percent. And the most remarkable aspect of all this progress is that, in the recent decades since the end of communism in China and other countries, the decline in poverty has accelerated to a pace unmatched in any previous period of human history. In 1981, the rate was still 42.7 percent; by 2000, it had fallen to 27.8 percent, and in 2021 it was only 9.3 percent.